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Abstract 
This thesis examines the gap between the objectified knowledge created by institutions and 
the expert knowledge or experience of one woman within institutional systems dealing with 
wife battering. Examining this gap reveals the patriarchal and hierarchical relations inherent 
in institutional systems and uncovers the discursive practices which they employ in order to 
construct ideologies about wife battering. The discourses of Law, Psychology and the 
helping professions stand in direct opposition to feminist discourses based in concepts of 
gender inequity and patriarchal domination. All discourses, however, are not created equal. 
The discursive battlefield is dominated by treatment discourses that insist battering is a 
sickness not a choice as feminist discourses maintain. This is validated by legal systems that 
remand or recommend that batterers enter treatment programs for abusing their wives. In 
order for feminists to compete successfully against dominant discourses they must construct 
a discourse which validates and encompasses the experiences of all battered women and 
resist the appropriation of services for battered women by the state. 
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Chapter 1 
Melanie1 
Melanie met Martin in 1992 and, following a whirlwind romance, quit her job to 
move to his place of residence. Melanie began living with Martin early in 1993 about 50 
miles outside of an isolated northern city. The first assault occurred about a month after 
she began living with him. Martin himself called the police and she left him, determined 
never to return. One week later Melanie found out that she was pregnant, and Martin 
persuaded her to give their relationship another try. With charges still pending from the 
first assault, Martin agreed to voluntarily enter the region's only treatment program, and 
Melanie refused to testify thinking that treatment would be better for him than jail. Martin 
entered a sixteen week program, but continued to assault Melanie throughout his treatment 
and her pregnancy. During the period of their relationship, Melanie left approximately 
three times, but was persuaded to return. 'f.he last assault occurred in August of 1994, 
after which Melanie contacted the police, gave a statement and soon after moved to a less 
isolated northern city. Martin was sentenced to six months in jail for two counts of 
common assault; one month for threatening to assault her, and five for "knocking me out 
and breaking my nose." He served four months and was released without conditions. In 
December, approximately one year after the court date, Martin appeared at Melanie' s 
home, requesting to see his son. Martin' s assertions that he had changed persuaded 
Melanie to let him move in with them on the condition that he attend a voluntary group 
1 Names and identifying factors have been have been changed in order to protect 
confidentiality and anonymity. All quotations without specific citations are from interview 
material with Melanie. 
2 
for batterers in town. About three weeks into treatment Martin started exhibiting abusive 
behaviour, so Melanie asked him to leave. Martin moved back to his original residence 
and he and Melanie are currently in an ongoing custody battle over their son, Nicky. 
Melanie agreed to talk to me after being contacted by a previous counsellor and 
co-worker of hers. She has been active in her new community co-facilitating groups for 
battered women and volunteering for court accompaniment for battered women. In fact, 
I had previously heard her speak at an event coordinated to raise awareness about violence 
against women. Hearing Melanie' s, and other battered women' s experiences, was one of 
the initial reasons that I had started my project. As her following statement makes evident, 
Melanie's commitment to promoting awareness and sharing her experience is clear. 
My first women's studies course .. . we all got to share our experience. And 
when we were studying a topic, like violence against women, all the 
women who had experienced that got to contribute. So, we weren' t just 
reading it out of a textbook, we were learning life experience, and that was 
great! 
Melanie emphasizes the importance of lived experience and education, an emphasis shared 
by myself and others interested in uncovering the complexity of relations in which women 
live. Although these relations are created by systems which organize the very social fabric 
of society, some are not easily or immediately perceived by those living within them. 
Building a Conceptual Framework: Standpoint Theory and the Social Organization 
of Knowledge 
To enlarge our understanding as women of how things come about for us 
as they do, we need a method beginning from where women are as 
subjects. As subjects, as knowers, women are located in their actual 
everyday worlds rather than in an imaginary space constituted by the 
objectified norms of sociological knowledge built upon the relations of the 
ruling apparatus and into its practices. (Smith, 1987: 153) 
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In the past twenty years, many grassroots organizations, diligent scholars and 
committed individuals have made visible the reality of violence against women (Caesar 
and Hamberger 1989). Wife assault cuts across all sectors of society. In a typical year in 
Canada, Johnson (1996) reports, 120 women are killed by their husband, ex-husband, or 
boyfriend, and almost 450,000 women are slapped, choked, beaten, sexually assaulted or 
threatened with a gun or knife. In 1993, 90 percent of spousal assaults in Canada reported 
wives as victims. Since the initial awareness promoted in the 1970s about violence against 
women, there has been an increased effort to both protect women from violence and to 
prevent the occurrence of wife battering. In Canada, there are approximately 400 shelters 
for battered women, 200 crisis centres providing counselling for battered women and 124 
treatment programs for men who batter (Johnson 1996). Despite the increase in services 
for battered women, protection and prevention techniques have been largely co-opted from 
the women's movement (Walker 1995), and have been absorbed into an institutional 
framework. With this co-option, some argue, the safety of women has ceased to become 
a primary concern. This project takes as its starting point the experience and knowledge 
of women in an examination of current social, legal, and theoretical difficulties facing 
battered women within this context. 
My research, on treatment programs for men who batter, will examine battering 
from Melanie's standpoint. This standpoint yields information about the social relations 
that constitute the position of battered women within the feminist movement as well as 
the multilayered institutional structures of law, psychology and the helping professions. 
All of these institutions are understood as having certain roles in the formation of 
4 
domestic violence as a 'social problem,' manifestations of which can be traced from the 
locus of women in their everyday worlds. 
Institutional Power and Women's Knowledge 
Locating women as expert knowers within the contexts of their lived experience 
is the key to unlocking an understanding that has remained elusive to social scientists. In 
fact the methods and theories taught to us as the "proper" way to "do" social science has, 
in Smith's view, done more to obscure our understanding of social relations than it has 
to reveal them. Feminists have long been searching for an alternative framework from 
which to view the differentiated social constructions of gender, a framework freed from 
the lens of masculine theory, thought and practice that is and has been posited as both the 
masculine and neutral (or universal) viewpoint. Feminist scholars such as Braidotti (1992) 
have located this difficulty in the access that men have to the "symbolic order," that is, 
men have easily constructed a link from their subjective positions to a larger conceptual 
framework which constructs society according to those positions. This places women in 
a position of defending or relating their experience from a subjectivity which is not seen 
as having the same access to the symbolic order. As a consequence of this exclusion 
women are denied access to the same type of validity or opportunity to construct reality 
that men enjoy as a right of gender. Harding notes that the means that feminists have 
sometimes employed to confront this exclusion have placed them in a somewhat 
paradoxical position theoretically: 
From the perspective of feminist theory and research, it is traditional 
thought that is subjective in its distortion by androcentrism -- a claim that 
feminists are willing to defend on traditional objectivist grounds. The 
ambivalence also appears when feminists appeal to scientific "facts," while 
simultaneously denying the possibility of perceiving any reality "out 
there" .... (Harding 1986: 138) 
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While it is easy to say that men dominate what is considered to be the objective (neutral 
and universal) sphere, and the social organization of relations springing from it, defending 
our position and reinforcing our critiques on a conceptual plane that does not depend on 
that very construction, as Harding demonstrates, is a tricky task. 
In conceptualizing the standpoints of women, Dorothy Smith (1987, 1990) has 
made us aware of a space outside this m~sculine construction, a space which we occupy 
as women2 because of our exclusion from the construction of the objective viewpoint. 
The articulation of Smith's methodology depends on a reconceptualization of the world 
in which we live and the development of alternative "methods of thinking" hinted at by 
the above quote, which is explained more clearly in what is to follow. 
Taking up the position that the social world is and has been constructed by a male 
subjectivity that excludes women but which defines women' s social relations and 
relationships, relegates women to a space outside of these relations. 
The making and dissemination of the forms of thought we make use of to 
think _about ourselves and our society are part of the relations of ruling and 
hence originate in positions of power. These positions of power are 
occupied by men almost exclusively, which means that our forms of 
thought put together a view of the world from a place women do not 
occupy. The means women have had available to them to think, image, and 
make actionable their experience have been made for us and not by us. 
(Smith, 1987: 19) 
2 Not only women occupy this space outside the objective sphere, Smith notes that 
race, class, and other forms of exclusion are factors as well. 
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The ruling relations and ruling apparatus (part of the complex interactions at play 
in the creation of objectified knowledge which is used to organize and mediate social 
relationships) ideologically construct the world we live in, organize our activities and 
define the basis of knowledge. What does this mean for women? It means that women's 
experience is not represented in ideological forms of thought which constitute objectified 
knowledge; as such women' s knowledge and experience are excluded and obscured. 
However, occupying this space outside the ideological organization while participating in 
these relations accords us a position from which we can examine them, if we can extricate 
ourselves from "objectivity." This "outsider's view" is essential in locating the rupture 
between experience and ideology, it produces what Smith terms a condition of"knowing." 
.. .ideological practices are at war with a knowledge-or perhaps better, a 
knowing -that begins from the site of people's experience. Ideological 
practices ensure that the determinations of the everyday, experienced 
world remain mysterious by preventing us from making them problems for 
inquiry. (Smith, 1990:43) 
An order of knowledge has been created that somehow stands outside the experience of 
the individual but which has been created out of it. Smith notes that "objectified forms 
of knowledge, integral to the organizations of ruling, claim authority as socially 
accomplished effects or products, independent of our making" (1990: 61). Women' s 
individual knowledge of their local social relations and experiences as represented in their 
daily lives are either omitted or transformed by the ruling relations, glossing over 
women' s lived experience and rendering their lives invisible. Smith's example of how 
mental health institutions organize and mediate the lives of the "mentally ill" 1s 
particularly powerful. 
Where the patient is privileged to speak of her experience her statements 
are treated not as information but as indications of what is wrong with her. 
Whatever has been happening to and with that individual who becomes 
defined as mentally ill happens where she lives, in the concrete, actual 
conditions of her experience and her relations with others--not as these 
become specialized into the relations and talk of clinical settings, but as 
they are lived .... The organization of psychiatric care serves to separate an 
individual from the context in which her actions arise ... she is taken from 
that context.. .into a process that progressively cleans her up and detaches 
her from the actualities and particular contexts of her living. (Smith 1990: 
91 ) 
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Investigating the standpoints of women provides us a way to examine that individual 
knowing from the place where these individual experiences reside, that is, in women' s 
activities, material relations and interactions with ruling institutions. In treating the woman 
as the expert knower, we uncover the rift between experience and objectified knowledge. 
We can challenge facts and assumptions created by ruling apparatuses and peel away the 
veils that obscure our own understanding of our lives. 
The everyday world in which we live can be viewed as a fracture point where we 
can begin to examine the layers of cultural meaning that have not be created by us, but 
for us. In this reconceptualization, the process in question is transformed from one of 
entering women into the symbolic order to the recognition of the fallacies present in that 
order. Only then can the implications of these fallacies be examined with respect to 
women's lives. Smith emphasizes that " ... we have assented to this authority and can 
withdraw our assent. Indeed this is essential to the making of knowledge, culture, and 
ideology based on the experiences and relevancies of women" (1987: 18). Medicine, law, 
psychiatry, and education are all institutions that participate in the relations of ruling and 
have been structured to create norms and models which may not, upon closer examination, 
suit the knowledge or experience of women's lives. Institutions make assumptions about 
the nature of women that have been constructed along certain gendered lines. 
These assumptions and the social organization in which they are grounded 
are drawn into question when we begin from the experience and actualities 
of women's situation. For then we locate our enterprises with knowers 
whose perspective is organized by exactly how they are located outside 
these structures, by how they are excluded from participation, and by their 
actual situation and its relation to the ruling apparatus. (Smith, 1987: 65) 
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Rather than feeling forced to defend our subjectivity in an objective world, we speak from 
the place where we are and have been situated, a place where our activities and experience 
can reveal our fractured consciousness, a place where we can construct knowledges that 
directly subvert the construction of the objective world. This is the place from which my 
enquiry begins. 
Academic Complicity in the Relations of Ruling 
Before we, as academic researchers, can begin our enquiry we must first examine 
our own part in the relations of ruling. In our roles as academic researchers, most have 
been trained in the objective modes of data gathering, interpretation, and textual analysis 
that are predominant in all forms of institutionalized education. Traditional social science 
methodology based in positivist thought has supported, helped to create and disseminate 
objectified knowledge through the implicit (and explicit) assumptions about how to do 
"good" research. This complicity has been based in a number of assumptions, some of 
which are: 
That good research is a product of an objective researcher 
That good research is a process which begins with a 
concept that is both real and open to investigation in the 
activities and texts of research "subjects" 
That social "truths" and generalities can be constructed, 
which reveal the nature of social situations. 
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Smith cautions against interpretation grounded in the notion of scientific 
objectivity, stating that it is impossible to remain outside the 'confines' of one's own bias. 
To disclose the interests and perspectives of sociological knowers does not 
as such invalidate a knowledge that is grounded in actualities. Showing 
that people are interested is insufficient as a reason for saying what they 
claim to know is biased by their interest and therefore invalid as 
knowledge. Curiously, objectivity in the social sciences is to be guaranteed 
by the detachment of the social scientist from particular interests and 
perspectives; it is not guaranteed by its success in unfolding actual 
properties of social relation and organization. (1990: 32) 
With this in mind, my research is less concerned with unveiling objective and positivist 
"truths" and more concerned in the grounding of my inquiry within a particular locus. In 
actuality, the refusal to accept that the very nature of our experience is biased can lead 
to the presentation of data that are implicitly skewed by 'objectivity'. 
If we begin from the world as we actually experience it, it is at least 
possible to see that we are indeed located and that what we know of the 
other is conditional upon that location. There are and must be different 
experiences of the world and different bases of experience. We must not 
do away with them by taking advantage of our privileged speaking to 
construct a sociological version that we impose upon them as their reality. 
We may not re write the other's world or impose upon it a conceptual 
framework that extracts from it what fits with ours. Their reality, their 
experience, must be an unconditional datum. It is the place from which 
inquiry begins. (Smith, 1990: 25, emphasis mine) 
For this reason, my enquiry begins with the words of Melanie herself. Her words, and 
those of women's advocates, guide the theoretical enquiries of the last three chapters, 
offering us a platform and reference point from which we can investigate institutional 
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organization. Theorizing from this information may not be wholly free of 
reconceptualization, but what it does offer is a way to investigate the mechanisms of 
social organization and provide a general view of how individuals are organized within 
larger institutional frameworks. Our effectiveness as social investigators depends upon our 
realization of our placement in the relations of ruling and particularly of ourselves as 
grounded in a specific subjectivity.3 To report on women with the conceptual tools given 
us by institutions is to render invisible women' s agency and to reconstruct their realities 
through text. Smith gives an example of how text mediates reality even before it reaches 
the researcher. 
Living individuals in their actual contexts of action have already been 
obliterated before their representation reaches the sociologist. Feminism 
makes us particularly attentive to the mode in which "domestic violence" 
is presented. The above passage identifies no agents; the presence of 
women, men and children as subjects in these relations of violence are 
suppressed; the presence of the oppressed, in riots, civil insurrections, and 
so forth are obliterated. The other side, the representatives of the state, do 
not do violence ... their forms of physical coercion are not identified. The 
mode is objectified. Who acts and how disappears. We cannot see what is 
going on. (1990:55) 
In this project, what is obscured is the context of state and institutional relations when 
dealing with the treatment of violent men. Treatment is posited as the solution to the 
3 Patrizia Violi, in her discussion of female subjectivity, debates the merits of a 
subjectivity which is not linked to the symbolic order. 
... a subject which established its identity through autobiography is not the 
'universal subject' ... it is a particular rather than a general subject, what 
one might call an 'exclusive' subject, deeply rooted in the particularity of 
its own story and in its own unique life experience. (1992: 172) 
Rather than avoiding the "exclusive subject," as researchers we must recognize that not 
only does this subjectivity exist, it must necessarily influence our actions and can also 
direct our investigation. 
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"public" problem of domestic abuse, obscuring the unequal power differentials between 
battered women and their barterers, and the attendant entrenchment of the public private 
dichotomy in women's lives. The visage of the state as a benevolent protector slips away 
under scrutiny, revealing hidden agendas. 
In this way, individual experience and reality are obscured. Smith points out the 
danger of a non-critical interpretive method. The "pictures" constructed by the state 
redirect the gaze of the reader, much like an optical illusion. It is this picture that is 
constructed as "truth," the "objective" knowledge presented becomes incorporated into the 
relations of ruling. 
We have learned to discard our experienced worlds as a source of 
concerns, information and the understandings of the actualities of the social 
world and to confine and focus our "insights" within the conceptual 
frameworks and relevancies given in the discipline. Should we think 
otherwise or experience the world in different ways ... we have learned to 
practise a discipline that disattends them or to find some way of making 
them over so they will fit. (Smith, 1987: 73) 
To begin from women's experiences, as I do, means very little if that experience is 
entered into the realm of objectified knowledge. It is here, Smith emphasizes, that we 
must exercise the most care, not only as academics and professionals, but as individuals 
who interact and are also determined by ruling relations. "Sociology, [and other 
institutions] provides a mode in which people can relate to themselves and to others in 
a mode that locates them as subjects outside themselves, in which the coordinates are 
shifted to a general abstracted frame and relations of actions ... " (Smith, 1987: 75). As 
feminists have been finding out, our disciplines have not until recently, and still may not, 
allow the personal or the subjective into our work when they are perceived to be outside 
of the scope of the discipline. 
The cannons of science as a constitutional practice require the suppression 
of the personal...Being a professional involves knowing how to do it this 
way, how to produce work that conforms to these standards... we begin 
from outside ourselves to locate problematics organized by the 
sociological, the psychological, the historical discourse. The perspective of 
men institutionalized as the "field" or "discipline" cannot, it seems, be so 
directly confronted with a personal source of experience, because to do so 
is to step outside of the discipline, to cease to do sociology or history .... 
(Smith 1987: 60) 
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The researcher in utilizing standpoint methodology must confront the limitations 
of her own discipline and question the "normal" methods of her discipline or profession 
in order to analyze the role of ruling relations in women' s lives. An inversion of general 
methods of thinking for the researcher is also required. In investigating the standpoints 
of women, we must begin with the particular, or local, and then move to an investigation 
of the extra-local and ideological organizations that determine or organize the local (it is 
the latter which becomes generalizable). We are not beginning with an abstract concept 
and then testing to determine a truth, nor are we attempting to make general statements 
about "women" or "all women." The general hypothesis and validation steps of science 
are of no use. Smith argues that " [a]s women members of an intelligentsia and therefore 
trained in the modes of acting, thinking, and the craft of working with words, symbols, 
and concepts, we have both a special responsibility and special possibility of awareness 
at this point of rupture" (1987: 49). If we look inward at our lives, we encounter fractures 
between our lives as academics and our lives as mothers, sisters, and wives. In other 
words, the demands of our professional lives, which are constructed along supposedly 
gender neutral lines, may not allow for the feminine constructed role of primary nurturer 
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and caregiver to a family unit. 
Linking the Local and Conceptual Through Discourse Analysis 
Our analysis then, must begin at the locus of women' s experience, but it cannot 
end there. Within feminist analysis, there has been an increasing shift toward the 
presentation of women' s voices in text in order to allow women to "speak for 
themselves." It is important to keep in mind that researching the standpoints of women 
does not seek to form a homogeneous category of "oppressed women." 
People on the margins experience different social worlds than do those 
whose lives construct and define the status quo. However this does not 
mean that people on the margins share a common perspective. What people 
on the margins do have in common is the way ruling relations organize 
their exclusion, depriving them of "the means to participate in the 
construction of forms of thought that are adequate to express their own 
experience." (Dale Spender 1981 , cited by Kirby and McKenna 1989: 95) 
We cannot take at face value the representation of women's experience in text alone, but 
must link these representations to an understanding of how women's experience reveals 
their interactions with ruling relations. In treating the everyday world as a problematic (to 
call into question that which we take for granted), we delve more deeply into the 
conceptual ordering of a society which treated as given certain conceptual categories in 
which " .. . [t]he concept becomes a substitute for reality. It becomes a boundary, a terminus 
through which inquiry cannot pass" (Smith 1990: 43). Traditional social sciences do not 
begin with a basic questioning of how categories such as capitalism, or the 'social 
problem' come to be formed in established methods of thinking. Smith provides an 
excellent metaphor: 
We get into this mode very much as the driver of a car gets into the 
driving seat. It is true that we do the driving and can choose the direction 
and the destination, but the way in which the car is put together, how it 
works, and how and where it will travel structure our relation to the world 
we will travel in. (1987: 73) 
14 
We move through a world that is, for the most part, structured for us, with underlying 
social relations and organizations that are unseen. The fracture4 point of experience gives 
us entry into the complex structuring of relations at an extra-local level. We can begin to 
link women's experience to these relations. 
In the research context this means that so far as their everyday worlds are 
concerned, we rely entirely on what women tell us, what people tell us, 
about what they do and what happens. But we cannot rely upon them for 
an understanding of the relations that shape and determine the everyday. 
(Smith, 1987: 100) 
This does not mean that women are incapable of determining or understanding the extra-
local, it is to say that a consciousness embedded in the local frame of reference cannot 
always "see" the discourses that shape the relations in their local contexts, and that much 
of this shaping occurs far outside the local context. 
The actualities of living people become a resource to be made into the 
image of the concept. The work becomes that of transposing the paramount 
reality into the conceptual currency in which it is governed. (Smith, 1987: 
53) 
4 My use of terms such as 'fracture' or 'rupture point' make reference to the gap 
between women's experiential knowledge of their own lives and that knowledge created 
for them by the relations of ruling. For example, advertising images offered by the media 
present the social roles of wives and mothers in specific ways which are not how women 
perceive their roles or live their lives. When women measure their lived experience 
against such representations they often encounter a gap or rupture point between how their 
lives are and how they are portrayed. This fracture point provides us an opening from 
which we can begin investigation. Smith terms this relationship disjuncture. 
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Smith demonstrates how concepts and ideologies are actual practices. Ideologies are 
formed and re-formed through this conceptual currency by ruling institutions who then 
define individuals,5 situations and actions in social relations. Sally Engle Merry extends 
this to show how ideology and discourse6 impact on people' s lives. 
5 Carol Smart writes of the legal system' s capacity to define individuals in specific 
ways through the examples of the construction of categories such as the prostitute and the 
homosexual. Smith also speaks to the categories of the 'single mother' and notes that 
these categories obscure much knowledge about the social constructs of individuals. 
6 The differences between ideology and discourse are not well articulated by some 
scholars and the terms are often used synonymously. The differences between ideology 
and discourse will be discussed further along in this analysis. For our present purposes, 
discourse is used to create, maintain, and transform ideology and ideological forms of 
thought. In this way, both ideology and discourse remain fluid and ever changing. 
Displacing ideology by discourse is, of course, a move undertaken in order 
to replace social contradictions (explained by ideology) .... Discourse blurs 
the hierarchies of power: we cannot distinguish the powerful from the 
powerless. (Ebert 1996: 8) 
Although I agree that in a postmodem sense, where power is viewed as aleatory, this is 
extremely likely to happen. However, I maintain that tracing discourses, which construct 
the ideologies of social groups, can actually highlight social contradictions, rather than 
displace them. Smith' s (1987) notion of discourse is far closer to the one used in this 
project. She notes that current discourse has evolved from the male-dominated relations 
of ruling, and states that all discourse is mediated by texts. Having noted this she points 
out that women have been successful in creating a public discourse "perhaps for the first 
time in history," but cautions that this discourse is in danger of institutional appropriation. 
The court imposes non-legal interpretations on the problems, and the 
plaintiffs resist these interpretations, demanding help in legal terms. I was 
drawn to this problem by my concern with the domination inherent in the 
ability of some to construct authoritative pictures of the way things are, 
pictures that others accept. These pictures are so powerful in that they 
suggest what must be done about a situation .... Who constructs 
authoritative pictures and who goes along with them are central questions, 
as are sources of authority that render some pictures compelling .... Some 
people resist the pictures painted by others, insisting on their own. 
(1990:ix) 
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The pictures Merry discusses suggest a 'formulation of discourse' to paraphrase Smith, 
created by the relations of ruling. Smith (1987: 216) posits that the central point of 
women's spoken experience will situate them within communities of oppression that can 
be "discovered in a discourse that can expand their grasp of their experience and the 
power of their speech by disclosing the relations organizing their oppression." This 
reconceptualization or new 'method of thinking' presupposes a 
... discovery from within, from differing bases and matrices of 
consciousness. It aims at the making of a discourse that is always being 
rediscovered and remade from a standpoint that is beyond, outside, 
discourse, always pressing on discourse for a means to speak, explore, find, 
know, map, organize, struggle. 
The accounts of Smith and Merry combine to provide us with a formulation of the 
contentious nature of discourses between individuals and ruling institutions. These 
contentious relations exist between individuals and institutions such as law, psychiatry, 
psychology, history, sociology, and feminism. 
Research and Standpoint Theory 
Those who have undertaken research that explicates how knowledge is socially 
organized have embraced two research strategies closely linked to the standpoints of 
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women. The first is institutional ethnography, which is based in interview methods as 
outlined by Smith. Alison Griffith describes the interviewing technique as follows: 
In our institutional ethnography, in contrast to any other research on the 
relation between families and schools ... we began with mothers and 
interviewed them about their everyday work of constructing the family-
school relation. We explored with mothers how the extensive family work 
process provides for the child' s participation in schooling... . Thus, our 
research in the schools held to the interests and concerns of the mothers we 
had interviewed, deliberately structuring our research of schooling to 
illuminate the social relations that had come into view through our focus 
on mother' s standpoint. (1995: 11 0) 
The second strategy in a social organization of knowledge approach is textual analysis of 
documents and media forms which mediate the relations of ruling. Gillian Walker, in her 
examination of the creation of the ' social problem' of domestic violence shows a 
transition in discourse over a specific period of time. She also demonstrates the increasing 
relegation of domestic violence problems to the legal and professional systems and their 
bid, through lack of funding, to silence the voices of grassroots organizations and agencies 
dealing with violence. The invisibility of battered women in the systems of ruling is also 
demonstrated. 
Within an analytic framework provided by American sociological studies 
of 'family violence' these recommendations formed a ' logical' response to 
a carefully researched and written exploration of the 'problem. ' ... This 
would potentially remedy the fragmentary and inadequate nature of 
existing services that were 'not oriented to the ' violent family' .... (Walker 
1995: 67) 
The identification of the most likely source of violence within the family is obscured in 
using the term 'violent family '. Also, an investigation into the configuration of violence 
as a ' social problem' relegated to certain public sector professionals is not questioned. 
This questioning is made possible by standpoint methodology. My interview 
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context is semi-structured and open-ended to reflect Smith's notion that " ... we do not 
disrupt the processes by the procedures we use, open-ended interviewing should therefore 
yield stretches of talk that "express" the social organization and relations of the setting" 
(Smith, 1987: 189). I used a list of questions as a checklist and a guideline as a way to 
keep conversation flowing. The interview with Melanie was taped on audio and fully 
transcribed in order to examine closely and identify her experience with respect to 
participation in the general organization of the institutional relations in the treatment 
context. The resulting material guides the investigation of ruling institutions and the 
discourses which sustain them. 
After extensive informal conversations with counsellors and women's advocates, 
I conducted one interview from which to begin analysis. In traditional social science 
methodology the concern over the singular representation of experience could prove cause 
for concern. However it is important to note here that contrary to traditional methodology, 
this interview does not constitute a "sample," rather it will offer an outlook on the world 
from which I can begin interpretation. As Smith asserts, the popular procedure which 
"presupposes a method of distilling generalizing concepts from the social organization of 
the local setting whereupon the latter becomes an instance of the general principles 
distilled from it" is not the aim of institutional ethnography or the social organization of 
knowledge. She argues further that 
The relation of the local and particular to generalized social relations is not 
a conceptual or methodological issue, it is a property of social 
organization. The particular "case" is not particular in the aspects that are 
of concern to the inquirer. Indeed, it is not a "case" for it presents itself to 
us rather as a point of entry, the locus of an experiencing subject or 
subjects, into a larger social and economic process. The problematic of the 
everyday world arises precisely at the juncture of particular experience, 
with generalizing and abstracted forms of social relations organizing a 
division of labour in society at large. (Smith 1987: 157) 
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The aim of this project is not to prove a previously determined point, but to direct 
research to a particular investigation of the ruling relations and the particular viewpoint 
of a woman' s place within them. The particular experience of the interview guides my 
research into an examination of the textually mediated discourses of the legal, and helping 
professions. These texts, in fact all texts, are part of the social relations which organize 
how we view the world. Existing analyses on the nature of discourse and the construction 
of discourses in law, the helping professions, feminism and psychology are examined in 
reference to the creation of ruling relations and the construction of contentious discourses, 
that is, discourses that continuously compete to define meaning. Questions of 
accountability, responsibility and institutional actions/reactions figure prominently in the 
discursive analysis. This project also closely examines the formulations of discourse 
theory put forward by Goodrich (1987) and Merry (1990) in order to trace the ideological 
configurations of discourse. How do women' s experiences with treatment programs affect 
our understandings of ruling relations? Specifically, I seek an understanding by raising 
several questions: Are women constructing their own 'pictures' (discourses) in relation 
to those put forward by the ruling apparatus? How do the dichotomies of sickness/healing, 
criminal/victim, and dominance/oppression play out in the ruling relations? How do the 
ruling relations shift and reconstruct themselves and discourse in order to accommodate 
the shifting of other discourses? Can we identify the gaps between popular treatment and 
legal discourse and Melanie's experiences? I believe that the answers to these questions 
20 
can only be answered in a framework that takes at its center point the experiences of 
women. 
Thesis Organization 
In the first section, I examined the necessity of understanding violence from the 
position of women's everyday lives, paying specific attention to the centrality of 
individual women's experience to understanding domestic violence issues. Melanie's 
"expert knowledge" is accepted as the link through which the relations of ruling are to be 
analyzed. 
In the second section, I analyze the disjuncture between the ideology represented 
m legal reform and policy, and the actual practice of legal systems from Melanie's 
standpoint. This examination concludes that legal systems, and society in general, 
participate in the construction of battered women as unreliable and difficult witnesses, as 
complicit in -- if not partially responsible for -- the violence in their lives, and as 
unworthy of legal protection. 
In the third section I investigate the claims made by clinical studies of treatment 
programs as to the effectiveness of treatment for male batterers, from both Melanie's 
experience, and that of feminist scholars and women' s advocates. It is demonstrated that 
clinical treatment data are not encouraging as to the effectiveness of programs and that 
feminists question the institutional, patriarchal and biased nature of these scientific 
findings. 
In the fourth section, using Gusfield's ideas on the formation of social problems, 
I discuss the institutional domination of ideologies surrounding social problems, their 
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appropriation and rejection of feminist politicization and gendered analysis of wife abuse, 
and the trivialization of both women' s experience and the consciousness-raising 
methodology necessary to feminist analysis. Fundamental differences between the interests 
of the patriarchal state and feminist analysis are highlighted with the conclusion that the 
state and its institutions are attempting to take ownership of wife abuse as a social 
problem and to institutionalize the response to wife abuse against the best interests of 
women. 
In the fifth section I investigate and define the discursive playing field, drawing 
attention to the struggle between feminist discourses around sexual domination and 
inequality, and the institutional discourses which are seated in a collage of psychological, 
liberalistic, legal and individualistic attitudes about the nature of wife abuse. I identify 
discourse as the primary tool through which ideologies about wife battering are formed 
and transformed. I conclude that the cumulative experiences of women, focused into 
discourses seated in the recognition of violence as a manifestation of gendered power 
relations, is pitted against institutional discourses in a battle to define the ideological 
climate of wife abuse. Until the basis of how society thinks about wife abuse is 
transformed, legal and psychological remedies will continue to fail. 
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Chapter 2 
The Response of the Legal Professions to Domestic Violence: We've Come a Long 
Way 
Baby? 
Unlike other victims of violent crime, battered women are often viewed by 
the police, the prosecutors, judges, jurors, and probation/parole staff as 
responsible for the crimes committed against them- responsible either 
because battered women are believed to "provoke" the perpetrator into 
violence or because they are believed to have the power to avoid the 
criminal assault through accommodating the perpetrator' s demands. Other 
victims of violent crime are not seen as culpable for the crimes inflicted 
on them, but battered women frequently report the criminal justice 
personnel appear to see them as "unworthy victims" who are clogging up 
the courts with unimportant family matters. (Hart 1996: 101) 
Battered women and their advocates have called upon police, judges, lawyers, and 
corrections personnel to punish, on behalf of the state, men who use physical violence 
against their intimate partners. Recent research and government reports all highlight the 
commitment of legal process to end violence against women in intimate relationships. 
The Violence Against Women in Relationships Policy7 in British Columbia 
"directs the justice system to emphasize the criminality of violence within relationships 
and to take the necessary measures to ensure the protection of women and children who 
may be at risk." At the same time, the Canadian State recognizes that "[a]s a result of a 
lack of understanding of the dynamics of wife abuse, the criminal justice system response 
7 Quotations from this policy are taken from the 1996 updates of the 1993 policy 
document. "Part 1 of the policy ... was developed in 1993 following a two-year consultive 
process to revise and expand the original 1986 Ministry of Attorney General Wife Assault 
Policy" (British Columbia 1996: 1 ). Also, quotations are taken from an earlier document, 
Violence Against Women in Relationships: Implications for Justice Personnel (1993). 
Sections of the Criminal Code of Canada were amended originally, broadening the 
definition of assault and sexual assault in 1983 (Johnson 1996). 
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has often created a secondary victimization of women victims" (1996: 2). In the 
following section, the experience of a single woman within the Canadian Justice system 
will be the lens through which research on the police, courts, and other justice personnel 
will be examined. 
Policing Domestic Violence 
Studies of the arrest and prosecution process report varied conclusions regarding 
the ability of arrest to deter domestic violence;8 these will be discussed later with respect 
to arrest and prosecution controls. For women who are battered by their intimate partners, 
police responses to violence prove to be an ongoing difficulty. 
[That] was the first major assault that the police came for. And that was 
like, two hours of getting dragged around the house by my ponytail and 
held up on the wall by my throat and feet off the floor, and he' s 6' 5" and 
290 [lbs] and he was kneeling on my chest with a piece of wooden 
doweling in his hand hitting the floor beside my head and it was really 
ugly. Part way through it he got up and he phoned the police and he said 
"get over here and get her out of here or I'm going to kill her," and then 
he beat me until they got there. 
The quotation presented above reflects the victim's view of the effectiveness of police 
in situations of battering. That her abuser had no fear of the police, and in fact contacted 
them himself, is a clear indication that he did not believe that he would be arrested or 
8 Although this project is concerned with whether other legal controls are effective 
in deterring violence, it will not focus on deterrence theories or those of social control in 
a context which does not deal specifically with violence against women. Peter Manning 
separates the theoretical role of police from the practical and social one by citing the 
"marketing" pull of "publicity, political forces, and movements" on policing. He 
concludes, "How to attack crime, exert social control expediently, avoid scandal, increase 
public support for police and reduce violence are police problems" (Manning 1996: 94). 
These political "problems" require careful scrutiny, as they directly affect battered women 
at the site of police intervention in battering situations. 
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punished by the police, nor did the impending arrival of the police cease his violent 
behaviour. Melanie's account of her violent relationship is littered with encounters with 
the police, which were very rarely, if at all empowering. 
I was still staying at a friend's, I hadn't moved back in with him, and he 
came there and he started to push me and he was gonna start assaulting me 
and I told him if he even touched me I was going to the police and the 
first time he pushed me I phoned the cops. And that time they took him 
and they just drove him down the block and dropped him off and they 
didn't press charges. And he still had charges pending from the first one. 
Melanie's -- like so many other women' s -- experience with the gap between public 
policy and police practice indicates that the "new" severity with which justice personnel 
are instructed to deal with domestic violence is not necessarily adhered to. In dropping 
Martin off down the block, the police obviously believed that they were fulfilling their 
role as officers of the law, despite exposing Melanie to the possibility of further violent 
behaviour. In doing so, they not only failed to protect her, but undermined her strategy 
of resorting to police protection to keep Martin's behaviour in check. It is improbable that 
had Melanie been attacked by someone unknown to her, the stranger would have been 
afforded the same courtesy. Klinger's study of policing domestic violence in the United 
States cites that "prior to the 1970s, many police departments had policies that directed 
officers to avoid arrest in such cases-commonly called "domestic" or "spousal" violence" 
(1995: 309). The notion that "domestic" violence was a "family" problem and therefore 
a "private" problem and not a "real" crime was prevalent (Dobash and Dobash 1979; 
Buzawa and Buzawa 1996; Hilton 1993). Given the radical change in legislation since 
then with the implementation of mandatory arrest and other pro-woman policies, how 
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then, do we explain Melanie's recent experience with the police? Ferraro and Pope cite 
the ongoing belief of police in their role as makers of peace, but not necessarily purveyors 
of the law, to explain their actions (see also Ferraro 1989; Jafe et al. 1993). 
The primary focus of police intervention into domestic violence is the 
restoration of a "semblance of order." Such a focus does not usually 
address the private terror experienced by a woman who is threatened by 
her partner. If the violence has subsided and is no longer visible to 
outsiders, including the police, officers perceive the situation "under 
control." (Ferraro and Pope 1993: 114) 
Although Klinger's research fmds no significant evidence that arrest is less likely for 
spousal assault incidents, Rigakos's research undertaken in Delta, British Columbia, where 
there is a mandatory arrest policy, finds that police attitudes towards women in violent 
situations are mediated by misogynist beliefs about women and the nature of violent 
situations. 
The whole arrest thing is bull shit. You have some real douche bags who 
keep the house like a pigsty. Then he gets angry ... and she' s drunk and 
slaps him. If he fights back she calls the police. Most of these things are 
started by women anyways, it's just that they're smaller and end up losing 
the fight. She shows you her wrists are red where the guy grabbed her and 
expects you to arrest him even though she hit him first. All he was trying 
to do is keep her from hitting him by grabbing her arms and forcing her 
onto the bed. (Male Constable cited by Rigakos 1995: 236) 
Contrary to public rhetoric, which states that no woman deserves to be battered and that 
all women have the right to be protected from violence, the stigmatization of women as 
lazy, shrewish, and antagonistic serves to reinforce the notion that women are responsible 
for the domestic sphere and the violence that accompanies it when she fails to carry out 
her duties. The attitudes of the Constable interviewed above are not only insulting to 
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women, but can be an obstacle to the effective implementation of mandatory arrest 
policies. In Arizona, Ferraro (1989b) finds that there is an unequal implementation of the 
presumptive arrest policy by officers according to their ideas about interpretation of the 
legal policy and ideological beliefs about the nature of domestic violence. Similarly Stith's 
(1990) research in the midwestern United States, finds that factors in police officer's 
lives influence police officers' attitudes and actions such as race and economic status 
(Ferraro 1989; Ferraro and Pope 1993), visible injuries and the offender's history of 
violence (Bachman and Coker 1995). 
Women can see the police as giving little assistance to them when they do call for 
intervention from outside authorities, preferring to deal with it themselves since "[P]olice 
are sometimes said to be reluctant to make decisions regarding culpability and arrest both 
parties ... " (Lyon and Mace 1991). In Melanie's case, police were reluctant to arrest her 
abuser at the hotel where they were staying even though she had a broken nose and other 
visible injuries, insisting instead that she and her son leave the premises as the room was 
in Martin's name . 
. . . he knocked me out in a hotel room with Nicky there in the room ... I 
called the police when I came to and they told me that I had to get out of 
the hotel room cause it was in his name. And they were just completely 
obnoxious and I told them to go fuck themselves and I would handle it 
myself. And then he got rude to them and they took him away on a drunk 
and disorderly but didn't charge him with assault. 
Aside from the fact that police are supposed to arrest when evidence of abuse is 
presented, Melanie believed that the police themselves were of little use to her, except 
when directly antagonized by Martin. When he was removed from the hotel premises, it 
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was not for abusing Melanie. This is reflected by the testimony of other battered women 
as given in the Canadian Panel on Violence Against women in 1993, which reported that 
"Many women told the panel that police officers know little about the dynamics of 
violence against women or take violence against women seriously" (214), and that 
By using their discretional power, police support or deny access to the 
justice system for women according to the narrow criterion of the "good 
witness," that is white, middle class, able, heterosexual, etc .... women who 
are assaulted who do not correspond to the ideal are often blamed for their 
own victimization (216). 
Melanie "pressed charges"9 herself the next day after making sure Martin was still in jail 
for drunk and disorderly conduct. 
Legal agents construct battered women as unreliable, and even hostile to police and 
justice enquiry. Melanie's refusal to testify in court against her abuser on a previOus 
occasiOn made police doubtful and suspiciOus of her. 
And I went to the shelter and I dropped Nicky off and someone- child care 
came and I went to the police station and I pressed assault charges. And 
at that time he already had a few charges so they weren't very willing to 
press charges cause they thought I would just back out again ... so they said 
that if I wanted to press charges I had to do a videotape an audiotape and 
a written statement and that if I backed out I would be charged ... 
The failure of the police to support Melanie in the first instance is compounded by their 
9 Melanie's use of the term "press charges" denotes a plural meaning and context. 
In the eyes of the legal system, "press charges" is a term which enables specific legal 
actions by particular officers of legal authority. Melanie's attempt to utilize the law to 
empower herself is carried out in the "pressing of charges," which takes on a particular 
personal and social meaning. This term, used in a following passage, is a powerful 
signifier of empowerment and action. Melanie' s decision to "press charges" indicates an 
autonomous decision making process by which she determines the course of action. This 
is a focal point in terminating her relationship with Martin. 
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disbelief that she would carry through in her testimony against Martin. While Melanie had 
refused once to testify against Martin because of his voluntary entrance in a treatment 
program, she now felt that she had done all she could. This was a last resort to protect 
herself and her child from Martin's abuse. After she made her decision to escape the 
brutal treatment of Martin, the police made it difficult for her to follow through, believing 
that she would back out of testifying again. This view of the reluctant witness is prevalent 
among justice personnel, and shapes the attitude that officers have when deciding the 
evidence in charging abusers. 
In Delta, the masculine occupational culture of the police department has 
contributed to negative stereotypes of women as liars, manipulators and 
unreliable witnesses; has fostered erroneous assumptions about the cause 
of violence in the home; and has pointed the finger at the"system." In 
addition, these perceptions help foster a selective memory process that 
magnifies the rare event of a battered woman failing to appear or refusing 
to testify and comparatively diminishes those cases that result in successful 
prosecutions. (Rigakos 1995:234) 
When women are reluctant to appear in court or to have their abuser arrested, they 
are interpreted by the police as wasting valuable police time, as not being serious about 
wanting to end the violence in their relationships, as "stupid" because they do not want 
their partners to be incarcerated, and as liking the violence because they stay in a violent 
relationship . 
.. . some victims of domestic abuse may be committed to continuing to heal 
the relationship that is scarred by abusive behaviour. In such cases the law 
offers little if anything and essentially takes the view that asking for the 
protection of the law is "blowing hot"; remaining with an abusive 
individual is "blowing cold"; and the law cannot help those who "blow hot 
and cold" at the same time. (Alberta Law Reform Institute 1995: 48) 
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Ferraro and Pope (1993: 96) attribute the "irreconcilable differences" between the police 
and battered women to a difference between the culture of power represented by police 
and other legal personnel, and the culture of relationships represented by battered women. 
They argue that the interests of jurisprudence are founded on a political liberalism which 
represents "contradictions between the needs of battered women and the . orientation of 
law." They argue that when women contact the police or other legal bodies they attempt 
to strategize controls, as Melanie did at first in order to attempt to curtail Martin's violent 
behaviour, that will end violence in their lives without having to sever ties to the batterer. 
Fear of retaliation and importance of family can go a long way toward keeping women 
in violent situations. 
The centrality of attachment to others in the lives of those women is 
accompanied by alternative values and fears. For those immersed in a 
relational culture, the ability to connect, nurture and maintain intimacy is 
highly valued. (Ferraro & Pope 1993: 100) 
Melanie left Martin three times during their relationship, and went back with promises 
that "it would never happen again." She explains that she never felt that she was at risk 
while with him, but only realised how much power he had after she left him for the last 
time. 
He choked me one time and I had bruises on my neck, fingerprints and 
that. So I wore a turtleneck, and I was in the bar sitting there one time 
having a coffee waiting for him to get off work and the barmaid came over 
and she started rubbing my neck for me, cause they always used to come 
give me back rubs ... But she did this and I had bruises and I said "Ow, 
Ow, Ow, don't do that today," and she pulled my turtleneck down and she 
looked and she said "He did that to you didn' t he?" And I said, "Yeah, 
just drop it it's none of your business," and she said "Why do you stay 
with him?" And I said "Well Laurie, he does that, but then he comes 
home." And that was good enough for me. You know? And that's really, 
really sad to say but that's where I was. So when I left him I started to 
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realise ... 
The importance of maintaining a relationship, even in the face of severe brutality, is 
linked to the "stand by your man" mentality that reinforces traditional gendered beliefs 
about women as the backbone of a relationship. Women are supposed to make 
relationships work, no matter what. This centrality of attachment is bolstered by the 
familial-based connections of women, the patriarchal ideology which emphasizes romance 
and relationship in women's lives, 10 and the dynamics of the abusive relationship in 
which women are socially, economically and physically controlled or limited by their 
abusers. One of Melanie's primary reasons for staying with Martin was that she hoped he 
could be a good father to his son. Another reason was that she still loved him despite all 
that she had been through. 
Because, like I still love him and I still--he tells me that he had a dream--
that I'm gonna get married and then somehow my marriage is going to end 
and ten years later him and I are going to get back together and its finally 
10 This ideology is exemplified by a news item presented in Ms. magazine which 
appeared in the Chicago Tribune entitled "Courtship's End: Men and Women are Paying 
a High Price for their Individualism," which states "that courtship has been severely 
damaged by feminist ideology goes almost without saying ... the reconceptualization of all 
relations based on power is simply deadly for love." It also states 
[f]or the first time in human history, mature women by the tens of 
thousands live the entire decade of their twenties--their most fertile years--
neither in the homes of their fathers nor in the homes of their husbands, 
unprotected, lonely, and out of sync with their inborn nature." (1997: 29) 
It is clear from this article that woman's nature dictates that her destiny lies in the 
fulfilment of a heterosexual relationship resulting in a traditional family unit, and that the 
search for equality is seen as striking a fatal blow to the romantic relationship. Apparently 
love simply cannot be based on mutual respect and a sharing of power, and an unnatural 
woman cannot expect to be loved. 
going to work, so he is just leaving me alone for ten years right now. 
[laughs] You, know? 
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Despite her feelings for Martin, Melanie vows that she will not return to him, yet her 
ongoing relations with him on behalf of her son, Nicky, still constitute them as having a 
shared family unit. Martin feels his rights as a father, and his connection to Melanie, will, 
at some time, make reconciliation possible. This is reflected in what Hanmer (1996) terms 
the "web of relationships" in which women live. Yet it is abhorrent to police, and society 
in general, that a woman can love her abuser and that even after years apart she can still 
love him. An excellent example of this is given in a discussion of orders for protection 
(OPs): 
For some battered women, fearing both invasion and loss of connection, 
the OP may be seen as a mechanism with the potential to remove the 
violence by her partner. She may perceive the OP as a technique for 
ensuring a violence-free marriage, continuing to live with her violent 
partner and holding the OP as a "guarantee" of protection should he violate 
his promises that "It will never happen again." For Judges, however, a 
woman' s failure to separate from the relationship once a OP is granted is 
a demonstration of a failure to respect the court and instigation to renewed 
battering. (Ferraro and Pope 1993: 100) 
This rationale is lost on the agents of the culture of power who draw the "solution" for 
violence from "[t]he desirability of order, profit, rational choice and a domestic realm of 
privacy" (Ferraro and Pope 1993: 103). Without desiring to essentialize women into the 
category of nurture or to exclude them from the capabilities of rational thought, 
consideration of the "web of relationships," or "culture of relations" highlights the 
complexity and intricacy of the connections in the private sphere that women traditionally 
occupy. Some women accept the authority of police as valid, seek refuge in the legal 
order, and get the punitive results they seek. But many others, whom society views as 
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acting in ways contrary to "rational" thought, are treated by the system as undeserving of 
protection and may be deemed " .. .irrational and deviant...They live with men who beat 
them and their children, become angry at police for trying to help them, and retract 
accusations of violence after arrests have been made" (Ferraro and Pope 1993: 105). This 
is well demonstrated in Melanie's case. Women viewed as such are just as victimized by 
the legal system as they are by their abusers, and considered just as deviant. 11 To 
validate only the experience of women who seek protection from the legal system opens 
those who do not to stigma and sparks the belief among legal agents that there are 
"deserving" and "undeserving" victims of abuse. This perspective is echoed by Hatty's 
(1988) research in Australia in which police officers separated the community into 
"hopeless families," where violence was chronic and required continual police 
intervention, and "responsible families," where violence was sporadic or resolved 
internally within the family. 
This is not to say that all members of the police share the above-mentioned 
attitudes toward women who have been battered, but to point out that the reforms12 of 
state policy which reflect a commitment to the plight of battered women may not be as 
entrenched as we would like to believe. Personal and societal attitudes toward domestic 
11 Examples of this deviance can be seen in Women, Violence, and Social Change, 
by Dobash and Dobash. They cite the psycho-pathological constructions of battered 
women in Great Britain as "prone" and "addicted" to violence through childhood. or 
embryonic experience, and also cite psychologists that conclude that battered women and 
their children should be locked up and treated. Theories of learned helplessness, 
masochism, and relationship addiction all implicate women as being responsible for their 
acceptance of violence. 
12 Such as The Violence Against Women in Relationships Policy. 
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violence have not completely altered to match those reforms. Hilton's study bases itself 
in the hypothesis that "the police are more concerned about doing what the public expect 
of them than controlling crime" (1993:38). Therefore, if society believes domestic 
violence to be a critical problem deserving of a stringent legal response, then police will 
treat it as such. Again, this represents a disjuncture between police practice and public 
policy, but not between public opinion and police practice. Hilton notes that the "official" 
position on wife assault in Canada is that it is wrong and that intervention is appropriate. 
When examining policy, members of the public may be convinced that the problem of 
domestic violence is being dealt with adequately. However, public opinion still emphasizes 
that stranger violence is considered the more serious problem. Hilton's findings that there 
was a low tolerance for violence in public opinion as a whole is considerably weakened 
by the same public' s response who viewed charging as more appropriate to stranger 
assault than to wife assault, and that strangers are more to blame for their violence than 
men who abuse women in relationships. Hilton states that 
[ c ]riminal charges were recommended most for the recidivist stranger 
assaulter. This was also the offender who was seen as most to blame for 
his behaviour, and a post hoc analysis revealed blame ratings to be the 
strongest singular predictor of whether charges were recommended. ( 1993: 
55) 
If, as Hilton suggests, society believes that stranger assault is in greater need of a legal 
response than wife assault, then how can we expect legal institutions to take woman abuse 
seriously? How can we condemn the police officer for the systemic belief that wife abuse 
is less serious than "real" crimes and thus deserving of attention? How can we stop police 
from dropping abusers off around the corner, and considering their job done? These 
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questions can be carried over into a discussion of other facets of the legal system as well. 
The Court and Correctional Systems 
In 1993, the Canadian Panel on Violence Against Women reported disturbing 
claims concerning violence against women and the existing judicial climate towards 
violence against women . 
... when responding to a call, police often do not give the woman adequate 
information on available transition houses, on social and legal services, on 
the case itself, or even their own name, number, and telephone number 
(216). 
The importance of the role of Crown attorney was emphasized in 
supporting women's safety. Many women mentioned that survivors were 
not made aware of the process of laying charges and testifying in court and 
commented on the limited involvement of survivors of violence in the 
process (219). 
Police often cite the failure of courts to carry through with the prosecution of domestic 
violence as a justification for their failure to enforce arrest policies (Jaffe et al. 1993). 
Individual attitudes held by police cited above can be said to apply to other criminal 
justice personnel as well. 
Victims of domestic abuse at times encounter persons exercising power in 
the legal system who hold stereotypical attitudes about race and gender. 
Police, judges or lawyers who hold such attitudes may be less than helpful 
to victims of domestic abuse. Encounters with such individuals may also 
discourage victims of domestic abuse from seeking help from the legal 
system in the future. (Alberta Law Reform Institute 1995: 47) 
While Melanie received what she considered to be a just response from the judge in her 
case, her encounters with the local police were discouraging indeed, as were encounters 
with other justice personnel. 
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Ford's (1991) study determined that prosecution, much like calling the police in 
Ferraro and Pope's study, is used by victims as a strategy to control violence in their 
relationships. Policies implemented by the Canadian Government and various states in the 
US such as "no drop" and mandatory arrest policies are said by Ford to contribute to the 
disempowerment of women through taking complete control over arrest and prosecution. 
All that women have left, he argues, is the ability to refuse to testify in court, or the 
negative power of not reporting the crime in the first place. This resistance undoubtedly 
has an influence on the construction of battered women as unwilling victims. Melanie' s 
refusal to testify in court after the first charge of violence was greeted with less than 
enthusiasm by the crown, and exhibited itself in what Ford terms a "negative power 
resource." 
. . . he still had the charges pending and when the court date came around 
I was supposed to be a witness for the crown against him. And I went in 
and I talked to the crown and I said "look, if you put me on the stand, I'm 
going to lie," 'cuz he had already gotten in to a treatment program ... 
An unenthusiastic crown is not the only impediment to women's empowerment. Melanie's 
defence lawyer maintained that he would not continue to represent her if she went back 
to Martin. This is a reflection of both the legal system's failure to support women's 
decisions or to withdraw them altogether if she doesn't do what is expected of her. 
Even my lawyer says to me, I--uh, you know he's great in court ' cuz he's 
mean as hell-- But he says to me after court, "you know, if you go back 
that makes me a failure." It's like, get over yourself buddy, this isn't about 
you .... even like the lawyer does that. And he's said to women ... "if you 
go back, I won't be your lawyer any more." Like, what's that? You are 
abusing her too ... so it's basically everywhere. I think the whole structure 
has to change. And I don't know how that's gonna happen, but I'm gonna 
do my part. 
36 
The revictimization of Melanie by her own lawyer indicates that the systemic abuse of 
battered women can happen from those who "support" her interests as well as from public 
service agencies. Melanie's lawyer's interests were certainly vested in his professional 
reputation, regardless of Melanie's decisions. 
Ford cites a number of reasons to explain why a battered woman may use 
prosecution as a bargaining resource, among them are: for protection, to get him "help" 
(counselling), to get support payments or property from residence, or simply to carry 
through a threat that she meant "business." Ferraro and Pope cite a 1988 study by Caputo 
in which eighty-seven percent of women who called police for help did so with the hopes 
that the relationship would change, not with the intent of ending the relationship. This 
lends credence to Ford's assertion that the problems that arise between victims and service 
providers "stem from a narrow definition of 'assistance' denoted in terms of the helper's 
role rather than the victim' s needs" (1991: 331), and begs the question of whether "no 
drop" 13 policies are primarily to assist victims and to make sure barterers go to trial or 
to decrease case attrition. 
The prosecutor's role in bringing barterers to justice is a crucial part of the legal 
response to battering. 
He or she interacts directly with police, victims, witnesses, defendants and 
their attorneys, and judges. In exercising broad discretion at various points, 
the prosecutor is most influential in shaping the course of events for both 
victim and defendant. (Ford and Regoli 1993) 
Even before a woman comes to trial, she may have faced several obstacles in the legal 
13 Indicates no dropping of charges after they have been laid. 
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system. Ford and Regoli discuss how prosecution decisions may be made on the basis of 
the "worthiness" of further processing, such as, the seriousness of injuries, prior record 
of the offender, or perceptions of so called negative victim attributes which call into 
question the woman's status as victim. In regions where there is a choice for the victim, 
heavy caseloads also lead prosecutors to enquire as to whether victims really want to 
pursue a case against their abusers. Factors that may wear down a victim's resistance are 
the length of proceedings and the inconsistency of response within the system. 
Also, trial can be both costly and traumatic for women. Ford and Regoli state that 
"[f]or victims, in particular, extended proceedings may require repeated contacts with their 
assailant and thus more opportunity for conflict" (1993: 146). Similarly, Goolkasian states 
"courtroom practices may vary dramatically in these cases, not only from one jurisdiction 
to another, but even from one judge to another in the same court" (1986: 81). There may 
be differences in individual attitudes toward domestic violence among judges. 
Even if the woman shows up in my court with visible injuries, I don't 
really have any way of knowing who's responsible or who I should kick 
out of the house. Yes, he may have beaten her, but nagging and a sharp 
tongue can be just as bad. Maybe she used her sharp tongue so often that 
she provoked him to hit her. (1986:81) 
That a woman might be unlucky enough to come before this particular judge, or one like 
him, is a serious consideration when dealing with the legal system. There is no guarantee 
that the judge or police involved may be sympathetic to women who testify against their 
barterers. Public policy cannot change all individual attitudes. It is no wonder then that 
women don't trust the justice system and are reluctant to testify against their abusers. 
Melanie's decision to testify resulted in a six month sentence for her abuser, which was 
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considered quite harsh by Melanie herself, as well as Martin's friends. Although the 
outcome was one which she could live with, travelling expenses to the region where the 
offenses were committed proved difficult to manage, and the charges caused Melanie 
some confusion, as my interchange with her indicates: 
... when they charged him with assault they did it as a summary conviction 
rather than an indictable offence . . . a summary conviction you can be 
charged for anything you have done in the past six months, and indictable 
offence would have been a more serious offence ... they charged him with 
common assault rather than assault causing bodily harm, and because they 
only charged him with common assault, only the past six months could be 
used. But I had already been gone for five months. 
[Myself: So it was prior to the court date?] 
I think prior to the charge but we had separated, like he had been 
assaulting me for two years and if they had charged him with assault 
causing bodily harm ... all the ones he had been previously charged for 
would have been brought in, and because they did it as a summary offence, 
there was two assaults that they could actually get him on, and one of them 
wasn't even an assault, he had threatened to assault me. 
Women often slip through the cracks of the legal system, and they may not be completely 
informed about or agree with the implications of their testimony, as indicated by the 
previously cited report of the Canadian Panel on Violence Against Women. As indicated 
by the previous comments by police officers and judges, decisions to enforce legal policy 
are sometimes arbitrarily made. Biases against battered women weigh heavily in the 
outcome of the prosecution of abusers. Established legal practice itself can disempower 
women in the courtroom. This is exemplified by Melanie's experience in court, where 
Martin was allowed to cross-examine her. 
... he just tried to make it like, you know, aren't you lying, and aren't you 
really the problem, and don't you think that you need counselling, and 
39 
things like that. 
That Martin was allowed to cross-examme her not only indicates the lack of 
understanding on the part of the legal system of the power dynamics inherent in domestic 
abuse, but also speaks to the legal privileging of the rights of the defendant within that 
system. These rights were constructed to protect individuals from the power of the state, 
but not necessarily the victim from the accused. 
The commonly accepted notion of the criminal trial which pitted State 
against the Accused fuelled the need to safeguard the rights of accused 
persons at every stage of criminal proceedings ... Although it is difficult to 
identify specific reasons for directly excluding victims there are factors 
which helped ensure that victims played a minimal part in the criminal 
process ... .It was widely believed that the victim's interests were more than 
adequately being protected by the Police and Prosecution. (The Canadian 
Criminal Justice Association 1985: 1) 
In Melanie's case, it meant that her abuser got to review past cases of his abuse against 
her in a more direct manner and that he had an opportunity to frame her retaliatory 
violence as aggressive acts against him. In framing the issue as Melanie's problem or 
Melanie's violence, she is implicated as having some responsibility for the mental and 
emotional damage done to her. The suggestion that she was the party in need of 
counselling is a particularly insulting tactic on the part of Martin to escape responsibility 
for his actions and to cast doubt on Melanie's testimony against him. This was 
unsuccessful, yet established legal practice exposed Melanie to more of the very abuse that 
she had appeared in court to prevent. 
And so he got six months in jail. And when they sentenced him the sheriff 
went to grab him and he turned around and came at me in the courtroom, 
and I fainted and my friend was beside me and she kind of moved--picked 
me up-- and took me out of the courtroom and, uh, like we kind of ... stood 
in the back corner until they got him out of the courtroom and then I came 
out of the courtroom .... 
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The irony of this passage is not lost on Melanie, the system that been so ineffective until 
court had finally been able to protect her, but not for long. In a continuation of his 
abusive tactics, Martin also had Melanie paged at the airport from jail immediately 
following the trial. This constituted a direct violation of one of the many restraining 
orders she had against him during their relationship. 14 
The perceptions of the limits and severity of legal sanctions are questioned among 
legal personnel, abusers and victims. Police fail to press charges because of leniency of 
court decisions; prosecution attorneys drop cases based on the inappropriateness of 
victims; victims do not report crimes because of their perceptions of police, all with the 
result that abusers do not take the "system" seriously. Martin "thought he was getting 
off," attests Melanie, "he was sure ... he had a job lined up that he was gonna work that 
night after court." The perceived severity of legal sanctions, embarrassment at having 
been hauled into court, or shame in committing the act cannot be relied on to deter wife 
abuse. Grasmick et al. find that, unlike with littering and drunk driving, the fear of 
personal shame, embarrassment and legal sanctions for interpersonal violence had not 
14 Harrell and Smith (1996) make reference to the failure of restraining orders to 
control abusive partners and the difficulties in the legal administration of protection orders 
(Alberta Law Reform Institute 1995). In short, these types of orders are often transgressed 
by abusers under the justification of "working things out," or to have contact with 
children. Several legal administrations impose fees and long waiting periods for protection 
orders and they must be renewed frequently. It has also been documented that legal agents 
often fail to enforce or inconsistently enforce restrictive orders (Rigakos 1995). All of 
these factors can deter women from seeking legal protection from abuse. 
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changed or were insignificant in the past decade "in a manner that would substantially 
reduce prevalence and incidence of this behaviour" (1993: 323). Lyon and Mace note the 
disgust that some family counsellors and women's advocates hold for the leniency and 
perceived limits of legal sanctions. 
That's demoralizing for victims, and for us, too. It teaches the guys that 
they can beat the charges, and that spreads fast.. .. [When no longer referred 
for alternative interventions] they learn that you can beat your wife for 
$100.00--they just have to do it more than once. (1991: 177) 
One of the professionals in this study remarked that abusers know that jail time is unlikely 
because of the cost and overcrowding of institutions. The position of some battered 
women in the institutional system is poignantly summed up by Melanie: 
... they don't get sentenced harsh ... so if it's acceptable in the justice 
system, how are you going to say, "No, you can't do it, you know, why 
can't you do it? ... you beat the hell out of your wife an average of--I 
think it's like thirty-five times that you are assaulted before you go to the 
police for the first time .... [T]hen when you do go to the police, they don't 
take it seriously or they think its a private family issue or they think that, 
"Oh well, she must have provoked it." So you don't get support in the 
police system and then you don't get support in the court system cause he 
doesn't get a harsh sentence, and then some of the counselling programs 
you go to tell you it's your fault. That's gotta change ... 
Even the relatively harsh sentence Martin received for his abuse was a shock to Melanie. 
She considered it to be an anomalous occurrence considering the stories she had read in 
media coverage of wife battering . 
... on the same page you have a guy--there's this one I read--... there was 
an article and then an article right underneath it and this guy got eight and 
a half years for drug possession, and this other guy got a suspended 
sentence for killing his wife. Like where's the rationale in that? I mean 
there-- you read the paper--and it's like one year suspended sentence, one 
year suspended sentence, you know, probation or a fine or--but who the 
hell goes to jail for--you know Martin got six months and everybody was 
like, "Holy fuck, that's a big sentence. First offence he got six months." 
... and that was a huge sentence, and I'm sure that that was because the 
judge was having a bad day .... 
42 
Her belief in the ambivalence of the court system is well founded. The justice system 
sends mixed messages to women by implementing policies that are meant to empower 
them, while at the same time maintaining an intrasystem ideology that clings to the notion 
that wife battering is not a real crime. Despite all the public attention given to wife 
battering, public opinion still does not appear to accept that wife abuse is as serious as 
stranger violence nor do all agents of the law. This contradicts a public policy dedicated 
to stopping wife abuse in the interests of the "public good." 
Crown counsel does not act on behalf of any specific victim, but rather 
represent, on behalf of society, a wider public interest. ... Crown counsel 
must recognize and indicate to the victim that despite her reluctance, 
society has an interest in prosecuting offenders who perpetrate violent 
crimes within their relationships. (British Columbia 1996: 11)15 
The recognition of wife abuse as against state interest and the interests of society does not 
entirely ring true, considering the actions of specific legal agents. A recent Globe and 
Mail article, "Officials Deny Special Treatment for Chretien's Son," discusses the release 
of Michel Chretien, incarcerated for abusing his ex-girlfriend and her son. He had 
breached the conditions for his original release that required that he not contact his ex-
girlfriend or her son. In response to the charges of special privilege, Staff Sgt. Hal Zorn 
of Regina stated that release is common procedure for "anyone who's arrested for a 
15Legislative changes in the Criminal Code in 1983 empowered officers to lay charges 
against someone they suspected of committing an assault under probable cause even if 
there were no witnesses to the assault. 
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violent crime, like an assault, if it is not considered that he be a danger to the public, and 
that is usually the case for common assault" (May 23, 1997: A9). By the very definition 
of public interest presented in the Violence Against Women in Relationships Act, an 
assaultive man is a direct danger to the public because he is a direct danger to his victim. 
Here, it is conveniently forgotten that women are a part of "the public." In defining her 
as such, she should be protected. Conveniently, in this case, a danger to one woman is not 
a danger to "the public." Women like Melanie cease to become the public, despite 
alarming numbers of women killed or injured by their partners. This contradiction clearly 
personifies the gap between the policy of the state and the practice of the state's agents. 
Battered women beware. 
If women are not part of the public, then where do they fit? Schneider describes 
the private realm that has hidden domestic violence 
The concept of privacy encourages, reinforces, and supports violence 
against women. Privacy says that violence against women is immune from 
sanction, that it is permitted, acceptable and part of the basic fabric of 
American family life. Privacy says that what goes on in the violent 
relationship should not be the subject of state or community intervention. 
Privacy says that it is an individual and not a systemic problem. Privacy 
operates as a mask for inequality, protecting male violence against women. 
(Schneider 1994: 43) 
Thankfully, due to the work of diligent women, the boundaries between public and private 
in domestic violence issues have been questioned; now policy reflects a rejection of the 
traditional dichotomy. But to what extent? The attitudes maintained by legal agents' 
victim-blaming statements lag far behind legal policy. The characterization of the nagging, 
provoking wife and girlfriend and unreliable, deviant and hostile witness remain in the 
minds of our police, judges, lawyers, and public. 
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In light of increasing fiscal pressure on corrections systems, can the state be 
expected to carry through on its mandate to prosecute all reported domestic abuse cases? 
The attitudes of some legal agents make this unlikely. Also, the wishes of battered women 
are considered to be contradictory. Women call the police for assistance and yet not all 
women want their abusers to go to jail. The difference between policy and practice of the 
legal system seems to reflect the systemic difficulty of dealing with these problems. All 
battered women, however, want to be free of the violence in their lives. If the statistics 
on the number of offenders are true, then the jails would be full within months if all 
offenders were brought to trial. Sentences appear very light in wife abuse cases, and there 
is an increasing relegation of protective and preventative controls to social service and 
helping professions. In fact, the business of treating male barterers has bloomed and the 
legal system provides many of these groups' clients. The following chapter debates the 
effectiveness of treatment programs for men who batter. 
Chapter 3 
Separating "Good" Men From "Bad" Behaviour: The Treatment Fallacy 
I am in constant reminder of the two people I cannot be with as I am 
carrying a pocket picture book to look at in my endless pacing of the 
house, and outside. Understand I realise how unwillingness to open up to 
you has caused this untimely parting of my soul mate and I cannot blame 
you for any actions taken against me to protect yourself against my temper. 
I only hope someday you realize underneath all my bullshit facade I will 
never and cannot wish you and our son any harm. All my actions and 
reactions were made in childlike mentality reverberating back to my 
adolescence or upbringing ... On this particular subject I have already read 
about in the Hand Psychology Handbook.... These and a lot of very 
important subjects are what I am now spending my days, early morning 
exercises, chakra meditation, and reading Hand Psychology. Many of my 
actions, anger, doubt and especially selfishness, denial and greediness, 
importance of self, have become painstakingly clear in my attitudes 
towards you. Your acceptance of my selfish actions is one of the main 
reasons I simply can't control my sobbing, wailing, and crying since we've 
been apart .. .I now have to face my past in order for these psychotic 
behaviour patterns to stop and be non-existent in me. With my deepest 
regrets and on my own doing I will face these alone .... I don't expect 
anything from contempt for the way I have treated you... [I] realise the 
irreparable damage done to this woman ... that I can not again hold, love 
or raise our son with, but will be forever in love with. (Letter from Martin 
to Melanie) 
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Caesar and Hamberger indicate that "specialized counselling programs ... have 
evolved for barterers [as a] response to a complex interaction between battered women, 
their advocates, the criminal justice system, law enforcement agencies, legislative bodies, 
and mental health professionals" (1989: xxx). Adams (1988) identifies five models of 
treatment intervention for violent behaviour: 
The insight model, representing the traditional model of understanding 
violence, which emphasizes the intrapsychic problems of barterers, such as 
poor impulse control, fear of abandonment, fear of intimacy, and impaired 
ego functioning as a result of early trauma; 
The ventilation model, where violence is considered a repression of 
feelings and faulty communication between individuals; 
The interaction model, based on the combined communication deficits of 
couples and their tendency to coerce each other; 
The cognitive-behavioral and psychoeducational models which emphasize 
that violence is a learned behaviour, and that as such, violence can be 
unlearned and that alternative behaviours can be learned instead. These 
models tend to focus on skill deficits; 
The profeminist model which sees violence as a controlling behaviour that 
creates and maintains an imbalance of power between the battering man 
and the battered woman. 
46 
Through the awareness promoted by battered women, feminist scholars and other 
activists, both the interaction and ventilation models have been widely rejected because 
of their view that the problem lies in the relationship and that both members of a couple 
are responsible for the violent behaviour. The insight model has been widely criticized for 
its emphasis on factors other than violent behaviour, but has nevertheless been 
incorporated into the dominant ideology about violence in relationships, and thus into 
treatment models. According to Adams, the most common forms of treatment are 
cognitive-behavioral/ psychoeducational and profeminist models. It should be noted here 
that the models presented above are cleanly categorized for explanatory purposes. In 
practice a combination of the most common forms of treatment is likely. It is a given, 
therefore, for treatment programs to vary widely within a town or city, and to differ 
between provinces or states. 16 The programs most likely to be attended by wife barterers 
16 It is important to make this distinction at this point. In my attempts to research 
treatment programs and to judge their effectiveness, I have been constantly reminded by 
clinicians and therapists that comparisons from one treatment program to another are 
virtually impossible (in the sense of a statistical evaluation, this is noted by Tolman and 
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are a "grab bag" (Dufresne 1995) of anger management training, skill deficit training, 
stress management, and sex role re-education. Martin attended and completed at least one 
such program. As Adams notes, the amount of sex-role re-education occurs on a 
continuum. "At one end of the continuum, some programs explicitly define battering as 
controlling behaviour, while others avoid discussion of sexism altogether" (1988: 190). 
As previously mentioned, the insight method is also represented liberally in program 
models where recognition of early trauma (abuse or witnessing of abuse) and the lack of 
self-esteem of batterers are incorporated into program process as contributing factors even 
if they are not the focus of intervention. According to Melanie, the programs that Martin 
attended were focused mostly on anger management techniques, skill and coping 
techniques, and sex-role re-education and were ten to sixteen weeks in duration. 
As noted above, the heterogeneity and relative newness of batterer treatment 
approaches increases the difficulty of speaking in general terms about treatment programs, 
however, there are some common features in specialized treatment programs for abusive 
men. These programs are commonly peer group meetings that are aimed at the recognition 
of the batterer's responsibility for violence and that emphasize the batterer's need to 
change his behaviour, not the victim' s need to change hers (Pence 1989; Pence and 
Bennett 1990). I had also been reminded that in interviewing women about their 
experiences with treatment programs, I must necessarily take the heterogeneity of 
programs into account. For example, an interview conducted with one woman who had 
experience with a partner in a treatment program in Ontario could not be compared with 
the experience of a woman in Saskatchewan. Although I acknowledge the relative 
heterogeneity of 
batterer programs, I nonetheless must state that there are a great many similarities in 
treatment philosophy. 
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Paymar 1993; Adams 1989; Martin 1985; and Caesar and Hamberger 1989). The length 
of treatment (Edelson and Syers 1990) ranges anywhere from ten to thirty-six weeks 
(Hamberger and Hastings 1993). Participants in programs can be mandated by the court 
or can volunteer, 17 as Martin did, for treatment. There are a number of different ways 
a barterer can be mandated to treatment: He can be mandated as a part of pretrial 
diversion or deferred prosecution "whereby the wife assaulter can have his arrest record 
cleared or the charge reduced upon successful treatment";18 he can be mandated by a 
"direct court order to participate in counselling as a sentence imposed following a 
conviction ... "; or treatment can be required as a part of a probation or parole agreement 
(Hamberger and Hastings 1993: 190). There are conflicting views concerning the possible 
differences of court-mandated versus voluntary treatment with regards to success rates, 
completion, and motivation for change. Tolman and Bennett conclude 
17 The use of voluntary to indicate motivation of clients can be misleading. Often, 
'voluntary' clients enter programs to save relationships after their partners have issued an 
ultimatum, or do so in order to demonstrate in an upcoming trial that they are motivated 
to change. Barterers are extremely resistant to change and enter treatment grudgingly 
(Tolman and Bennett 1990). 
18 Diversion is not recommended for wife assault in British Columbia. This is made 
plain in The Policy on the Criminal Justice System Response to Violence Against Women 
in Relationships which states, "[i]n cases of violence against women in relationships, 
diversion is not generally appropriate, given the possibility of further assaults on the 
victim" (1996: 18) In Violence Against Women in Relationships: Implications for Justice 
Personnel, it is also stated that "Diversion is contrary to the policy' s stand that violence 
is a criminal offence that should not be minimized" (1993: 3). Both policies give 
"exceptional" circumstances in cases where the offender agrees to attend a treatment 
program, the offence is not of a serious nature, or the victim has been consulted and 
referred to victim services where diversion and support services have been explained. The 
ambiguity of these special considerations undermine the stance taken on diversion in the 
above policy, considering the justice system' s lack of effective response and stigmatization 
of wife abuse. 
Although some differences emerge, when demographically matched, court-
ordered and voluntary men seem more similar than different. There is no 
evidence that would support separate groups or other differential treatment 
for court and non-court-mandated men. (1990: 101) 
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Often mandated and voluntary abusers are treated together and so for the purposes of this 
study, the two will be conflated unless specifically categorized for explanatory purposes. 
The critical question for women with respect to treatment programs for men who 
batter is: Do they work? Indeed there has been a seemingly unending supply of effort, 
time and funding to answer this question. Hamberger and Hastings, in their 1993 
examination of twenty-three programs for men who batter, find that research is 
inconsistent scientifically because of non-standardized treatment approaches, faulty studies 
and inconsistent reporting. In fact, they divert our attention away from this primary 
question to a secondary question. 
As noted above, we need to move beyond the crude question of whether 
"treatment works," and ask what treatment works best for what clients and 
under what conditions. Few (or no) agencies have a sufficient variety of 
treatments, adequately large client samples, or assortment of conditions to 
tease out these issues. It becomes important that all treatment agencies 
specify what they are doing with sufficient clarity that cross-study 
comparisons (meta-analysis) can be done. (1993:222) 
The re-definition of this question transforms the framework in which battering is 
conceptualized from one of "battering men" to specific types of battering men, and to the 
most appropriate treatment response for these typologies of battering men. The search for 
factors which will enable clinicians to improve intervention for specific men has proven 
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elusive (Hamberger and Hastings 1993; Tolman and Bennett 1990; Dufresne 1995). 19 At 
the same time the re-definition of the question implicitly accepts that treatment is and can 
be effective in ceasing the violent behaviour of barterers. Turning briefly from this 
conversation, an examination of particular studies of treatment programs may shed some 
light on the initially posed question. 
Even by the standards of traditional clinical research, programs have not been 
proven effective. Tolman and Bennett, in their review of quantitative research on men 
who batter, assert that "[r]esearch on outcome[s] of intervention with men who batter 
helps us determine whether woman abuse can be prevented through such intervention," 
however they find that "[t]he pattern of outcome results does not clearly support 
psychological intervention as the primary active ingredient in changing men's abusive 
behaviour" (1990: 103, 111). They identify problems such as high attrition rates, reliance 
on barterer self-reports for cessation statistics, and misguided criteria for success. High 
attrition rates for mandated and non-mandated programs are a problem for treatment 
practitioners (Dufresne 1995). Saunders and Parker not only attest that men who batter 
are extremely reluctant to enter treatment, but that as many as three-fourths drop out of 
19 The search for typologies of men who batter must be distinguished here from the 
identification of factors, such as use of alcohol and other narcotics, which have been 
found to contribute to the success of treatment intervention. Other factors contributing to 
completing treatment have been identified, such as age, employment status, and number 
of offenses, however these may be an effect of treatment formulation (being tailored to 
a specific class) or types of barterers mandated into treatment programs. Tolman and 
Bennett assert that "The heterogeneity of behavioural and psychological characteristics 
suggest that no one pathology can be linked to battering" and that "[i]t remains to be seen 
whether certain personality profiles ... can utilize the type of treatment resources generally 
available to batterers"(1990: 101). The search to treat the specific typologies of barterers 
continues despite this contrary evidence. 
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treatment. They also dispel some commonly held beliefs about the attrition rate of 
mandated batterers. 
A common assumption among policy-makers and practitioners is that legal 
sanctions will increase treatment compliance.... The available empirical 
evidence, however does not support this assumption. (1989: 21) 
This is a disturbing factor, since dropouts are said by Hamberger and Hastings (1990) to 
have higher rates of recidivism. The fact that batterers tend to minimize their reports of, 
downplay, and justify their battering behaviour (Tolman and Bennett: 1990) in the first 
place does not place much validity in their self-reports of cessation of violence. Police 
reports are only marginally more reliable as they can only gauge the number of reported 
acts of renewed violence (Dutton 1988). For example Martin had not only abused Melanie 
during the course of treatment, but repeatedly after treatment; this violence was not 
always reported, and would therefore be absent in follow-ups by treatment groups. 
Finally, the criteria used to determine success is a disturbing problem among treatment 
practitioners 
... some studies consider reduction of violent behaviour a success while 
others set complete cessation of violence as the criteria for success. 
Viewing reduction as success is questionable; reduction of violence may 
not end the terror that battered women face .... (1990: 103) 
Since women are more likely to remain with batterers who enter treatment programs 
(Adams 1989; Gondolf and Fisher 1991; Dutton 1988) it seems essential to determine how 
treatment programs might affect the lives of battered women. 
Harrell (1991), in her study of three treatment programs in Baltimore, finds that 
the treatment programs 
failed to meet the expectations of the victims, the courts, and the treatment 
providers in stopping or reducing violence, improving victim safety, and 
reducing the need for justice system intervention. Indeed, many of the 
smaller, and not significant, differences suggested higher rates of problems 
among treated offenders than among others. (cited by Dufresne 1995: n.p.) 
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Harrell's work, because of her controversial findings, is often dismissed as not making 
intuitive sense by other researchers and needing further study or replication before 
validation. Dufresne discusses the findings of an Ontario study in which Burns, Meredith 
and Paquette found that attrition rates were far higher than previously reported; of the 
two-thirds of men who complete treatment and who remain physically nonviolent after 
a brief follow-up period, only about one in three are psychologically nonviolent; and that 
longer treatment periods did not reduce violence. They concluded that treatment programs 
had a "viable but limited" role to play in dealing with abuse and that 
... the existing data on the effectiveness of these programs do not appear to 
justify their use to the exclusion of other types of intervention. Perhaps the 
most worrisome example of this is the use of treatment as a diversion from 
prosecution. Given poor completion rates for the treatments themselves, 
and the limited success of these treatments among those men who do 
complete them, it seems ill advised to place so much reliance on these 
interventions. (Dufresne 1995: n.p.) 
In the face of some of the clinical studies on the efficacy of treatment programs, it seems 
that the initial question of whether treatment programs work is not so "crude" after all. 
In fact, the balance of women's lives may be at stake. Reliance solely on clinical data 
may obscure other ways of finding an answer to this question. 
Battered Women, Advocacy and Women's Knowledge 
In a discussion of political and methodological debates in wife abuse research, Yllo 
reviews the problems with "scientific" studies of wife abuse . 
... the quantitative approach that is at the core of the positivist paradigm 
carries the greatest prestige and respect in the area of family violence, as 
in all of social science. A great deal of this status can be traced to the 
privileged position of science and masculinity in our culture. (1988: 40) 
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This paradigm is so strong that decontextualized studies of treatment programs are taken 
at face value; studies that do not make intuitive sense to researchers (in other words, 
studies that are not in accordance with the expected positive outcome of treatment 
programs) are rejected in favour of "further research," as are many of the programs 
discussed by Tolman and Bennett. Critiques of this research by women's advocates and 
battered women are shrugged-off as "unscientific" and subjective. 
The challenges offered by feminist researchers , shelter workers, and 
battered women, themselves, are defined as subjective. Their way of 
"knowing" about the topic has not been gleaned through scientific method, 
which, supposedly, enables an "objective" analysis. Rather, their 
understanding is grounded in body and feeling as well as mind. The fusion 
of thought and feeling is regarded as diminishing rather than enhancing 
knowledge. (Yllo 1988: 41). 
According to Yllo, the fact that most researchers and clinicians are men, and most 
advocates and victims women, only serves to deepen this division and to accentuate status 
differences. Dutton's quotation below casts doubt upon whether the true point of 
psychological intervention is to guarantee the safety of women, which may require 
ideological change, or to make barterers feel comfortable. 
Accordingly, we favour anger-management techniques that can be adapted 
to a variety of social milieus rather than attempts to generate ideological 
change that may be incompatible with the client's background and needs. 
It is important for therapists, if they have strong personal feelings about 
social change, to separate their roles as therapists and change agents. 
Otherwise, they may not be acting in the best interests of their clients. 
(Dutton 1988: 158, emphasis mine) 
The critique of therapists committed to social change that Dutton provides above serves 
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to highlight the imposed division between what therapists are supposed to do as 
professionals, and what they might do outside of the professional, and scientific sphere. 
That social change may be the key to ceasing battering behaviour, as feminists attest, is 
clearly not part of the clinical ideology. You cannot want social change and stop battering 
behaviour at the same time, Dutton seems to say. Mainstream commitments to social 
justice such as legal reform and more client services are acceptable and objective, 
subjective feminist movements toward social transformation are not. The experiential 
knowledge of battered women and the work done "in the trenches" is appreciated, but not 
valued or validated by state agencies (Yllo 1988: 43). 
Melanie' s experience with a partner in treatment reflects and reinforces the 
differences between clinical accounts of treatment programs and women's experiences 
with them. Melanie refused to testify against her husband the first time he was charged 
because he had voluntarily entered the region' s only program. He spent sixteen weeks in 
the program, which he completed "successfully" in the eyes of his counsellors. 
Most times I'd pick him up ' cuz we only had one vehicle and we lived an 
hour out of town. So I'd pick him up and on the way home we would talk 
about how group went and he was always really angry ... like he shouldn't 
have been there because the stories that he heard in there were just 
horrible .... He wasn' t like that, and you know, yes he needed some help 
but he wasn't like that, - and- but I was just happy that he was going to 
the group thing. And he continued assaulting me through my pregnancy 
and through group, although it was less so while he was in group, but it 
was still pretty bad. And the last group was at the beginning of December 
and our son was born ... before group ended actually, the end of October 
he had assaulted me and I started bleeding and I was in the hospital in 
early labour. 
Martin' s voluntary enrolment in a treatment program was a conscious decision to avoid 
legal sanctions and to keep his abused partner. His minimization of his violence and his 
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conviction that he wasn't like the other men in treatment no doubt contributed to this 
rationalization. Contrary to popular clinical belief, Martin's participation in treatment did 
not even halt his behaviour while he was enrolled. In fact, the failure of treatment to stop 
Martin's violent behaviour had potentially fatal consequences for Melanie and her child. 
I think this one' s very important.. . .! was about seven months pregnant and 
he had given me a fat lip and bloody nose... So I just got in the car and 
he got in the car and I just drove straight to the counsellor's office because 
there was no communicating at this point between us and so we had to be 
done, and I had had enough. And I walked into the counsellors office and 
we sat down, and she had both of us in there .... I said "I've had enough," 
like "I've had it," "Look at this! I'm, you know-- I'm sitting here big and 
pregnant and I've got a fat lip again and I don't want to be here any 
more," .. .I wanted him to leave me alone. And she told me that when I said 
things like that he felt threatened and that's why he reacted the way he did. 
So it was my fault like, ' cuz I wanted to leave, that was why he hit me. 
This victim-blaming statement on the part of Martin' s counsellor exemplifies the critique 
of women' s advocates that the safety of women is not always the paramount concern of 
some treatment providers. Not only is this an indicator of the failure of treatment to stop 
violent behaviour, it also signals the refusal to hold Martin responsible and to notify the 
police of his violent behaviour. Melanie' s direct appeals to Martin's counsellors to remedy 
his violence were turned against her. Could Melanie's safety be bargained for productive 
treatment results? Is treatment not supposed to ensure the safety of the victim first and 
foremost? Not only was Melanie' s safety secondary to treatment initiatives, but she was 
now responsible for Martin's violent behaviour, while Martin received all of the support 
a "client" could possibly have . 
. . . I feel that they supported him in feeling alright about feeling abusive. 
I don't think they supported him in changing .. .it was more of, uh, an anger 
management and how to stop the violence not looking at the root cause of 
it.... when you want to hit her take a time out, but then it became my 
responsibility, like why didn't you tell me to go take a time out, rather 
than him taking the responsibility of taking a time out. 
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Again, Martin's violent behaviour becomes Melanie's responsibility. Melanie believes that 
the "root cause" of Martin's violent behaviour stems from a patriarchal society which 
values and reinforces men's power over women. This system, to use Melanie's words, "is 
in every part of our society, it's enforced by media, uh, through everything .... " Her belief 
in the gendered nature of violence is manifested in her discussion of the bonding process 
of barterers in group therapy . 
.. .I don't think that they even think about that, you know, he's already got 
enough control obviously, he doesn't go out and punch other people out 
he just punches me out. So he's pretty selective in his choosing I'd say 
that takes control.. .. I felt like it was more of a bragging session where all 
these guys could go in and say "oh, I punched mine this week and this is 
why," and 
[Myself: Did you get that sense from him, that that's what it was?] 
Yeah. Yeah, I really did .... I mean the stories ... he would tell me stories 
about other men in the group and ... 
[Myself: And how he wasn't that bad, I remember you said that.] 
Yeah, yeah he wasn't like them. But he was terrible. 
Treatment group provided Martin with an opportunity to further downplay his violent 
actions to himself, and Melanie, by comparing them to the actions of other men. The 
estimation that he wasn't that bad in comparison is a clear bid to evade responsibility for 
his own behaviour. Melanie also recognizes the power stratification between herself and 
Martin (and his counsellors' participation in it) and notes that he must be placed in a 
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"non-power position" in order for him to really understand how violence has affected her 
life. Living in constant fear of his abusive behaviour, both mentally and physically, she 
expresses her disgust with Martin' s counsellors . 
. . . he didn' t have to hear how it affected me, just what he had done. And 
you know ... they were definitely not effective counsellors, they were his 
support system. I mean they said that they were his support system. How 
could you be supportive of someone that's abusive? I mean you can't 
support them, you know, he' s gotta be thrown out on his own .... I think 
that he's got to be confronted on it, and I think that he's gotta hear the 
effects of that on the woman. And not just the fact that my nose was 
busted .. .! mean I spent ten days in a transition house and didn't step 
outside those doors for ten days [pause] and fear, constantly ... [A]t night 
Nicky would be sleeping and I would be watching out the window 'cuz 
he's driving around the transition house. They had great security ... but I had 
visions of him coming and just blasting through there with a gun and 
getting me anyway, ' cuz I mean if he wanted to he could. You know those 
locked doors aren' t going to stop him. 
Melanie lived in constant fear of Martin, even after leaving the community in 
which they lived. Martin' s incarceration provided the emotional security from which 
Melanie could build a new life without fear. Her new life, however, was not a guarantee 
that Martin would not return. After Martin' s release from jail, Melanie relented to his 
requests to see their son, believing that she would be depriving Nicky of his father if she 
did not allow it. His protests that he had finally changed and his agreement to enter a 
treatment program in the town that Melanie had moved to, persuaded her to allow Martin 
to move in with them. Despite his statement that he was a changed person, Martin' s 
presence was marked by the shadow of his returning violent behaviour, held over Melanie 
in implied threats. 
Yeah, I mean especially- he had already been through a sixteen week 
program, so by the time he comes here .. . he knows all the lingo and he 
knows what he' s supposed to say to make them happy and he can do that. 
And I think that it also made him able to be abusive in a more subtle way, 
because he knows what he can' t do, but he also knows other ways to do 
it that aren't as easily recognisable. 
[Myself: What kind of ways are those?] 
Well, like, okay. The last time, instead of hitting me, he would say, "I 
can't do anything right, and I'm trying I just can't do anything right and 
you attack me all over the place and you give me so much negative energy 
that it just makes me feel like going back to the way I was," right. So it 
would become my responsibility for his feelings. And he learned that at 
counselling, you know, he didn' t come up with that on his own, that was-
you know - he learned that there. I really think that the counselling 
programs are really dangerous that way because they do give false hopes 
and because they [men] can just be better manipulators. You know, they 
know the lingo, they know the boundaries, they know forms of abuse 
they'd never done before 'cause they teach them all of them. 
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The threat that Martin could "go back to the way he was," in response to Melanie' s 
"negative energy" implies that Melanie herself would be inviting physical attack if Martin 
chose not to continue his changed behaviour. The threat of physical danger paired with 
the manipulative tactics which Melanie felt were sponsored by treatment represented a less 
overt but equally dangerous situation to Melanie. The rigid boundaries imposed by legal 
sanctions on the definition of abuse as largely physical damage, and the emphasis on 
reducing physical abuse, pave the way for abusers to hone their non-physical abusive 
tactics without fear of re-incarceration. Gondolf and Fisher (1991) call this the creation 
of "nonviolent terrorists." This is amply demonstrated in the opening text of this section. 
Martin clearly knows his way around the psychological discourse in which phrases like 
"childlike mentality reverberating back to my youth and adolescence," and "psychotic 
behaviour patterns," acknowledge the validity of early trauma to treatment practice. He 
also appeals to Melanie's feelings of love and the importance of family relationships by 
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evoking images of raising their son together. His reference to his "bullshit facade" signals 
his helplessness in the relationship. His objectification of Melanie as "this woman" 
attempts to wax poetic, yet, at the same time it exposes his inability to understand the 
impact of his violence on her. Melanie's account clearly describes how men can and do 
use these types of language to manipulate their partners and to psychologically abuse 
them. By the time Martin got to the second treatment program, he had mastered all of the 
language and was able to provide the appropriate responses to his counsellors, and to 
Melanie. She notes that abusive behaviour can manifest itself in more subtle, and 
damaging ways. 
[imagining what Martin might think] "Yeah, and now I can do all these 
other things that I never thought of." You know, and a lot of them are 
more subtle than the ways that they would use before that. And then as a 
woman, "Oh, he' s not punching me any more so he's better." Even 
though he's still totally abusive he' s just not doing it the same way any 
more, so you don' t recognize it the same. 
[Myself: And the law looks at that differently too.] 
Well, yeah, you can't charge someone for being mentally abusive, you 
know, and it's worse I think. 
Because there is little or no physical damage, women may be more inclined to stay 
with their partners, who can learn to abuse in different ways. Burns, Meredith and 
Paquette (in Dufresne 1995) echo this concern. They are disturbed by the number of 
women remaining in violent relationships that appear only marginally improved. Melanie's 
voice joins those of other battered women and women' s advocates in disputing the 
effectiveness of treatment programs for men who batter. 
Battered women and their advocates are placed m direct opposition to an 
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authoritative hierarchy of knowledge which maintains that treatment programs provide 
safety for battered women. When compared to this authority, Melanie's voice becomes 
lost in the face of the certainty of treatment professionals that programs are effective. Her 
resounding "no," in answer to the question of whether treatment programs work, should 
be the first voice heard. Instead it is totally obscured, or potentially heard only in response 
to a questionnaire, as are other women's voices. These women become statistics in 
effectiveness studies, reduced to a percentage (even if a large one) of recidivism. Melanie 
herself has been a battered woman and women's advocate, victim and activist, and client 
and agent. Her perspective, and those of other battered women and their advocates, in the 
cause against battering should form the basis for enquiry into the controversial topic of 
treatment programs for barterers. 
In a package released by Montreal Men against Sexism, Dufresne (1995) 
identifies several problems with the implementation and philosophy of treatment programs 
for men who batter. Through an examination of the proceedings of a 1991 conference, 
The Evaluation of Treatment Programs for Male Barterers, he draws upon discussions 
between treatment practitioners and women's advocates and activists (as well as other 
supporting data) to show perceived problems with treatment models. Highlights of this 
discussion, especially in light of the testimony of battered women such as Melanie, serve 
to underscore the gravity of continuing programs which contribute to the further 
oppression and victimization of women. 
One of the largest problems, contends Dufresne, is the acceptance of a 
psychologizing approach, without locating any particular pathology. He believes that to 
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accept this approach denies the enormity of violence against women as a gender problem 
and a social problem. 
One of the requirements of any competency assessment has to be a 
consensus on the dynamics of conjugal violence. The existence of any 
valid therapy requires a consensus on a pathology and a typology of 
affected subjects. Yet, after twenty years of research and ceaseless efforts 
to arrive at these, these pursuits are at a dead-end in the very words of 
these specialists. The hypothesis that wife battering is some kind of disease 
amenable to therapy simply doesn't hold water in the face of the available 
data. (1995: 3) 
Studies of treatment programs have not proven them effective. Furthermore, treatment 
programs, like the ones discussed by Adams, use models which blame victims and 
minimize the impact of violence on victims. 
Barbara Pressman goes one step further to point out that violence cannot be 
contained solely in the context of a mental health problem for men, that it must be the 
social context which informs our understanding . 
... the rate of abuse of women in the home is so pervasive (encompassing 
all economic, cultural and religious groups) and so extensive ... that one 
cannot explain behaviour of such epidemic proportions as an intrapsychic 
phenomenon or relationships and interactional patterns gone awry .... It is 
the described societal context that must inform our treatment of abusing 
men. (in Dufresne 1995: 3) 
Bograd (1988), shares Pressman's views, citing the long-held belief of feminists that 
woman abuse is neither a rare nor deviant phenomenon, but a factor which emerges 
directly from the development of the public/private division within the isolated nuclear 
family and an attendant male dominance over women. She asserts, 
The focus on psychopathology suggests that wife abuse results from 
abnormal behaviour. However, the widespread prevalence of wife abuse 
suggests that it may be more a function of the normal psychological and 
behavioral patterns of most men than of the aberrant actions of very few 
husbands .... Most importantly, through a focus on mental illness alone, 
most psychological theories ignore the question of power. (1988: 16) 
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This perspective re-frames the issue of violence. It rejects the concept of male 
violence as a manifestation of men's uncontrollable actions, skill deficits, and anger 
management problems. Instead, it replaces this concept with a view of male violence as 
an issue of power differentials between men and women that are upheld by the male-
centered socio-legal and psychological norms present in contemporary society. When 
examined in this light, the violent behaviour of men becomes a choice, not a dysfunction. 
To solidify this point, Dufresne uses the following quote from sociologist and 
criminologist Ann Jones. 
It's vital to understand that battering is not a series of isolated blow-ups. 
It is a process of deliberate intimidation intended to coerce the victim to 
do the will of the victimizer. The barterer is not just losing his temper, not 
just suffering from stress, not just manifesting "insecurity" or a 
spontaneous reaction "provoked" by something the victim did or (as 
psychologists put it) "a deficit of interpersonal skills" or an inhibition in 
anger control mechanisms." These are excuses for violence, popular even 
among therapists who work with barterers; yet we all know aggrieved, 
insecure, stressed-out people with meagre interpersonal skills who lose 
their temper without becoming violent.... But in fact that violence is 
himself, perfectly in control and exercising control. (cited by Dufresne 
1995: 7) 
As well as highlighting the possibility of conscious choice on the part of barterers, Jones 
asks us to examine the sources of excuses that barterers consciously use to justify their 
behaviour (see Adams 1988). The opening quotation to this section provides insight into 
the excellent manipulative skills available to Martin and to his ability to say and do the 
correct things when he feels it is to his best advantage. This suggests that men can learn 
new abusive skills from treatment. Tolman, responding to a conference participant's 
comment states, 
Men often misuse the pro-feminist aspects of the program as well. They 
adopt a very sensitive stance, but then they take the language of equality 
and turn that back on their partners, saying "Now you are not treating me 
equally; you are psychologically maltreating me." Our sensitivity to 
psychological maltreatment can backfire. They can say ... "She' s just as 
abusive as I am." That is the pro-feminist sensitivity - the idea of 
psychological maltreatment, in part, comes out of a pro-feminist framework 
-but yet it can be misused by men. (Dufresne 1995: 24) 
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Are therapists inadvertently complicit in the maintenance of violent behaviour through 
their treatment approaches? Dufresne briefly discusses Dankwort' s study of treatment 
program therapists and their attitudes and methods of therapy in which he finds that 
"[g]enerally, respondents explained the etiology of wife abuse in terms of intrapersonal, 
interpersonal and social structural factors, while overlooking the utility of using force," 
and that "this effectively removed agency from men' s violent behaviour" (Dufresne 1995: 
24). Also, therapists themselves, as Jones adroitly points out, attribute men' s violent 
behaviour to skill deficiencies, stress, and anger management problems. Dankwort also 
notes counsellors' beliefs that social and legal sanctions are incompatible with treatment 
through their attempt to "reconcile the antithetical nature of the social control demanded 
by victims' advocates, on the one hand, and the compassion counsellors were eager to 
provide on the other. .. " (Dufresne 1995: 29) Dufresne concludes 
Whether these problems are due to an "anything goes" level of theoretical 
improvisation or, more likely, to a visceral hostility to the feminist analysis 
of male power, they translate into the demonstrated ineffectiveness of 
programs and counsellors, at a time where these should be rejecting 
societies "explanations" for barterer's violence and keeping them from male 
bonding and from using therapy as a reinforcement for their misogynist 
attitudes and controlling strategies. (1995: 28) 
This does not provide an encouraging picture for women who have partners in treatment. 
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Barterers and barterers' programs are not accountable for their conduct, pro-feminist 
material is sometimes appropriated and turned against women, and this justified under 
the rhetoric of protecting women from abuse. Feminist calls for social transformation have 
been ignored in favour of the definition of the problem as one that can be solved by 
existing mainstream theories and practices. 
In May 1991, two staff members ofthe Family Violence Program in Ontario were 
fired for refusing to re-start a barterers' program after it had been halted for review (for 
undisclosed reasons) in 1989, on the grounds that it was dangerous to women (May 23, 
1991, The Spectator cited in Dufresne 1995: n.p.). They were eventually fired for their 
non-compliance. When the executive director of family services was asked to comment 
on the program he replied, "It's a relatively new field and in one way it's a very exciting 
thing because there are so many different opinions and approaches" (May 31,1991, The 
Spectator cited in Dufresne 1995: n.p., emphasis mine). The lightness of this response 
mocks the number of women that are repeatedly victimized in their homes while their 
partners practice their anger management skills and learn new and exciting ways to 
terrorize without having to batter. Tom Caplan, a therapist for an abuser program in 
Montreal, states 
If one man in the group changes his attitude, realizes that it is not 
appropriate to batter or to show power and control, and begins to advocate 
on behalf of women, it's worth it. (cited in Dufresne 1995: n.p.) 
What of the women whose partners are sent home to repeatedly abuse them? This "give-
it-a-further-try optimism" (Dufresne 1995) is particularly destructive when paired with a 
legal system fraught with misogyny in an institutional framework whose " ... social system 
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... uses therapy to factually diminish men's responsibility and to keep women in marriages 
and in the home ... " (Dufresne 1995: 33). Treatment programs are part of male-centered 
hegemonic power relations that maintain control of women by men in the patriarchal 
capitalist state. In a feminist framework, they are not part of the solution, ergo, they are 
part of the problem. 
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Chapter 4 
From Social Change to Services and Agents to Clients: The Institutional 
Appropriation of Battered Women 
The ability to coopt opposition is one of the great strengths of the 
patriarchal system; it is what has allowed it to perpetuate itself throughout 
history. Institutions are its main tools of control. We can improve the 
functioning of institutions, but we cannot change their primary function 
unless society itself is transformed. For the time being, institutions exist to 
serve and promote the interests of the State. (Lacombe 1990, translated by 
Dufresne 1995: n.p.) 
What are the interests of the state? A key component in answering this fundamental 
question is the comprehension of how state systems create and maintain control over 
"social problems." Gusfield reveals the complexity of state creation and maintenance of 
social problems. 
The idea of "social problems" ... is a part of how we think and how we 
interpret the world around us, that we perceive many conditions as not 
only deplorable but as capable of being relieved by and requiring public 
action, most often by the state. The concept of "social problem' is a 
category of thought, a way of seeing certain conditions as providing a 
claim to change through public actions. (1989: 431) 
Gusfield notes that all human problems are not public ones; unrequited love, disappointed 
friendships and frustrated ambitions have not been constructed as problems requiring 
public policy or requiring change through public action. Previous to feminist demands that 
wife abuse required public recognition and action, domestic violence was considered a 
private problem restricted within the confines of the family (Barnsley 1985; Walker 1990). 
Movements toward women' s rights, prisoners' rights, and children' s rights have 
pinpointed similar "new" problems as responsibilities of the "welfare state." Gusfield's 
conceptualization of the welfare state is the "long run drift in modem societies toward a 
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greater commitment to use public facilities to directly enhance the welfare of citizens" 
(1989: 432). This description directly asserts a social responsibility for resolving social 
problems and places this resolution within a context of a benevolent state. These 
configurations are not without their price. Once the state is involved in the solution of 
social problems, movements have limited control over their definitions, as demonstrated 
below. 
The Upkeep and Maintenance of Social Problems 
The state's recognition of the social problem signals a transformation of 
meanings and problems, and initiates a process whereby the state "takes control" of the 
social problem through its relations of ruling. Gusfield writes 
... the occupations that serve "social problems"--what I call the "troubled 
person professions"; and institutions that inform ... are significant parts of 
the process by which publics experience social problems, interpret and 
imbue them with meaning, and create and administer social policies. (1989: 
432) 
Thus begins the commodification of the solution of social problems in the construction 
and expansion of facilities and professions to deal with them, creating separate 
organizations which owe their existence and continuing survival to such problems. 
Gusfield uses one aphorism taken from a description of missionaries in Hawaii to explain 
the profit of the state in the social problem market: "They came to do good. They stayed 
and did well." 
The troubled person professions rely on what I call institutional complicity to 
maintain their hold over the ownership of social problems. State agencies validate each 
others ideologies if they can see advantages for their own. For example, the adoption of 
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treatment into the legal sphere alleviates certain correctional stresses, as well as delegating 
the messy problem of what to do with barterers. This ownership of this social problem 
depends on the ideologies of sickness and healing, without which it would collapse. 
The development of professions dedicated to benevolence, the so-called 
"helping" professions, depend on and accentuate the definition of problem 
populations as "sick, " as objects of medical and quasi-medical attention. 
The "troubled persons" industries, as I like to call them, consist of the 
professions that bestow benevolence on people defined as in need. Such 
occupations include counsellors, social workers, clinical psychologists, 
foundation administrators, operators of asylum-like centers, alcohol 
rehabilitation specialists, researchers, and the many jobs where the task is 
to bring people who are seen as trouble to themselves or to others into the 
stream of "adjusted citizens." (ibid.: 433) 
The further elaboration of institutional ownership is hidden under the designation of a 
problem to the realm of treatment. If the problem is one of individual sickness and 
treatment then it can be solved by social, and already existing (institutional) means. If 
however, the problem is one of contested meanings or is posited outside institutional 
control, than no existing remedy may suffice. To own a social problem is, in Gusfield's 
view, the ability to not only define the problem, but to solve it using public facilities. In 
order for this to be effective, there must be a consensus of meaning rather than a conflict 
over meanings of a social problem. 
In Gusfield's view, the ability to define the framework within which social 
problems are examined and addressed is the ability to claim that a societal consensus of 
meaning exists, negating the possibility of politicization around the social problem. For 
politicization to occur around an issue, Gusfield maintains, there must be a conflict over 
meaning. Gusfield uses the example of child abuse to explain this view. Initially, the 
acceptance and consensus of meaning of the deplorable nature of child abuse and its 
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attendant identification of poor parenting as the difficulty, framed the consensual meaning 
of child abuse. When however, issues around poverty and its linkage to child neglect 
formed a different framework from which to view some child abuse, the simplicity of the 
institutional definition of child abuse became a politicized, and contested view. An 
alternative framework posited different causes, and therefore different remedies for child 
abuse. In order for institutions to preserve their expanded network of controls in dealing 
with social problems, they must necessarily maintain an ideology which is in accordance 
with the institutional treatability of social problems. Gusfield cautions us that we must 
always be aware of what "institutional arrangements hide from us," and that" ... we need 
to take care not to separate the study of meanings from the study of their historical and 
institutional settings" ( 1989: 439). 
Wife Abuse as a Social Problem 
Gusfield's explanation of institutional appropriation of social problems is played 
out in contemporary debates regarding institutional responses to wife abuse. As 
demonstrated in the two previous chapters, the responses of both criminal justice systems 
and psychological professions have been widely criticized and proven ineffective when 
compared to the individual experiences of Melanie and the knowledge of feminist activists 
and advocates that work on the "front lines" of domestic violence. Before an investigation 
of this debate is undertaken, it is important to first reiterate the feminist critique of the 
objectivity and neutrality of the state and its various agencies. MacKinnon articulates 
a fundamental critique of the state and its institutions as inherently representing the 
interests of a dominant male perspective. 
The parallel between representation and construction should be sustained: 
men create the world from their own point of view, which then becomes 
the truth to be described. This is a closed system, not anyone' s confusion. 
Power to create the world from one 's point of view is power in its male 
form. The male epistemological stance, which corresponds to the world it 
creates, is objectivity: the ostensibly noninvolved stance, the view from a 
distance and from no particular perspective, apparently transparent to its 
reality. (1982: 537) 
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Institutions are supposedly non-objective and non-neutral and, to further MacKinnon' s 
argument, convey an underlying male perspective masquerading as the objective position. 
Hence, any solutions proposed to social problems will necessarily stem from this 
"objective" position. Feminist critiques, before they are uttered, are placed in a subjective 
and conflicting position to the dominant ideology represented in the objective world. The 
early formulation of domestic violence as a private problem within the patriarchal family 
unit was disputed by feminists who sought to make the "reality" of women known in the 
public world. The feminist slogan to politicize the personal opened the cupboard door and 
pulled forth the "dirty laundry" of patriarchal relations represented by the everyday 
terrorization of women in their homes. For feminists, there was no doubt that the social 
problem of wife battering was a result of a gender inequality which pervaded all facets 
of society. How then, did institutions react to this? 
Institutions have addressed the problem of wife abuse through its appropriation as 
a social problem, however they have rejected the very basis of feminist argument; gender 
inequality. At the same time that legal institutions and the helping professions were 
reformulated to attack the problem of wife abuse, they rejected the gendered analysis 
which had given birth to the movement and reconceptualized solution within institutional 
boundaries. The stigmatization of battered women as unworthy of legal protection and 
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unqualified to participate in the conceptualization of treatment is made clear by Melanie's 
marginalization in both processes. The attendant dismissal of activist and feminist voices 
by institutions maintains the patriarchal nature of the state its institutions. 
Barnsley describes her experience as an activist working within an institutional 
framework: 
Institutions ... do not deem women's experiences of wife battering to be 
worthy of analysis on their own terms, nor do they accord status to those 
who do, i.e. feminists and activists. What follows from this approach is a 
definition of the issue as family violence, subsuming women's interests 
into a more general frame worthy of "public" interest; a definition that 
obscures who is doing what to whom; that reframes political issues as 
social problems, thus minimizing inherent structural challenges; that fits 
more closely the institutions and the state's existing problem-solving 
apparatus; and that ultimately makes women's situation invisible. This 
approach effectively serves to protect the status quo, the existing political 
system, and its structures and institutions. Institutions can do all this 
without appearing to be acting out of self-interest which, of course is what 
they are doing. Rather they give the appearance of being fair and 
responsive upholders of the greater good. (1985: 73) 
It is most convenient for institutions to accept wife battering as a psychological difficulty 
rather than a systemic one, easier to accept "violent couples" (Dutton 1988) and "violent 
families" (Walker 1990) rather than focusing on the abuse of power of men over women, 
and far easier to maintain their own systemic controls backed by the same gendered power 
base that feminists confront, than to disband themselves and destroy their own power 
bases. It is far easier, and more beneficial for institutions to absorb feminist ideology and 
to pay lipservice to it, than to attempt real change. Institutions have a vested interest in 
maintaining their own hierarchies and the status quo, just as Martin had a vested interest 
in maintaining his control and power over Melanie. To set up treatment as a remedy and 
to assert that it can "fix" Martin through therapeutic means is to outwardly address the 
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problem without questioning Martin' s choice to batter. The institutional absorbtion of 
feminist ideology is readily apparent in a discussion of the "shelter" or "transition house" 
movement. 
The absorption of previously offered services based on advocacy reveals itself in 
the move to "professionalize" shelter and social services, which form the core of 
consciousness-raising and activism among battered women, reducing them solely to clients 
(insert victims); to control and continually cut the funding for shelter services and other 
services for women, while favouring new programs for families and men who batter (who 
may treat women's interests as secondary to the interests of "the family"); and to uphold 
the patriarchal social structure of the family and create a notion of familial equality which 
re-writes women's realities. 
Quinby shares her experience with working in a second stage transition house in 
Vancouver. She, like so many other women drawn into the shelter movement, believes 
that shelters and transition houses provide an opportunity for women to share their 
expenences, and to fight the patriarchal relations which support, if not encourage 
battering. 
I am concerned about the hierarchal structure of some houses and other 
services that have been created for battered women. I am disturbed by the 
trend towards counselling and away from advocacy. I am concerned about 
the rush to standardize and codify our work. I believe that these trends will 
ultimately destroy the services, and battered women will end up filed under 
some psychological sickness in the big book. The opportunity to give 
women real change in the patriarchy will be lost in a mire of diagnoses, 
pills, and court orders. I believe that many of the solutions that are popular 
today are proposed without a clear understanding of the real problem. 
(1995: 264) 
The fear that battered women will be victimized by newly professionalised shelters and 
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transition houses is well founded as transition house workers and battered women have 
witnessed the revictimization of women through the social service network (Freeman 
1995; Barnsley 1985; Stipe 1996). Preference for inexperienced workers with credentials 
over previously battered women and experienced workers within the shelter movement 
creates an unwanted division between potential activists and privileges institutional 
aptitude over experience. A degree or professional training is no substitute for the 
experience, support, and consciousness-raising which battered women can offer each other. 
The institutional method of providing services for battered women is placed in direct 
opposition to the movement's philosophy of working with women to end their oppression 
and removes agency from battered women' s lives. 
How can we really help a woman feel she is a competent person who can 
make sound decisions? By not controlling her with demeaning rules .... By 
not suggesting she is co-dependant, or has some flaw that attracts violence. 
By not requiring her to attend group or counselling. And most assuredly 
we will not ask her to sign an agreement to "work on herself, " an 
appalling insult to her injuries .... We must celebrate her strengths, support 
her, and treat her with respect. (Quinby 1995: 269) 
There are feminists and activists working within institutional settings, but they are limited 
by a framework which disempowers women (Barnsley 1985). Walker points out that "the 
contradiction embodied in this process of professionalization lies in the fact that its very 
success eliminates the possibility of a more radical critique" (1990: 213). As women get 
more "professional" help, their opportunities for a collective recognition of and action 
against patriarchal institutions are lost or absorbed by institutions, who then can appear 
as though the problem of battered women is solved by treating the symptoms and not the 
cause. Forde, a director of Kaushee's place, the transition house for Whitehorse, writes 
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of the Yukon Government's decision to eliminate core funding for the house, and its plans 
for Health and Social Services to take over the running of the house. 
There have been no guarantees as to the ultimate fate of the service, the 
workers, or the many women and children who currently live there ... . We 
don't know the final outcome yet, but I think the attitude of our 
government, and the difficult climate they help create for women 
concerned about men' s violence, is made clear by their latest tactics. 
(1995: 101) 
She attributes this takeover partly to anti-feminist sentiments toward the house, and to 
the continuing trend in the Women's Directorate to attribute wife battering as a 
communication problem between the sexes. To attribute battering solely to dysfunctional 
relationships ignores the power imbalance based on traditional gender roles between 
individuals and the use of violence to maintain that power. Lacombe speaks of the same 
difficulties in Quebec, following a 1985 decision by the government to fund only the 
accommodation function of shelters, while incorporating all other programs into its own 
general-purpose community centres. She writes 
In our view, feminist intervention and the global approach are 
irreconcilable with the functioning and overall objectives of the 
institutional health and social services network.... In an institution, the 
woman is and always will remain a "client", which creates a very specific 
relationship: that of "helper" to "helped"... (cited by Dufresne 1995: n.p.) 
Institutional services may address women's basic needs, but cannot provide the same 
experiential support which Melanie found so useful. In the same document, Dufresne cites 
a newspaper article that estimates that Quebec spent $620, 000 on the twenty community 
programs for men who batter compared to $405, 000 the year before. The same article 
also states that" [t]he 40 shelters who deal specifically with battered women and children, 
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operate on a budget of $182, 000 a year" (Dufresne 1995: n.p.). Often, social service 
agencies will attest to treating "the whole family," rather than "breaking up the family" 
suggesting that "individuals are in service to a system, in this case the family, rather than 
that social systems exist to nurture growth and expression of the human beings in them" 
(Carlin in Dufresne 1995: n.p.). This summation also suggests that women who wish to 
stop the violence in their lives are responsible for ruining the inviolate "family." The 
interest of the institutional network in the uninterrupted function of the nuclear family is 
certainly vested. The family is the seat of patriarchal power that is cemented by ruling 
institutions . 
... social institutions, like the courts, work against women in order to 
uphold men's privilege. Without understanding of the link between wife 
assault and women's oppression in the family, we can easily recreate 
oppressive family structures in transition houses and other women's 
services and programs, send women unprepared into court and other 
systems that are biased against them, and overlook one of the key forces 
that perpetuates male violence. (Prieur 1995: 248) 
Prieur's attempt to locate the disappearing feminist analysis of the link between wife 
assault and the patriarchal family is reinforced by Quinby's analysis of child custody 
decisions and the "Father Is Magic Syndrome," which asserts that a father's abuse of his 
wife has little bearing on his rights to have custody, a situation with which Melanie is 
quite familiar. 
Well, I've seen worse fathers ... worse cases get visitation and access and 
what have you .. .I ' ve seen fathers that are sexually assaulting their 
daughters have access. So, I don' t doubt that if he is persistent he will get 
some kind of access. 
Also, courts and family services have used the potential for a woman to enter another 
abusive relationship (because of her learned helplessness) as grounds to apprehend her 
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children (Mahoney 1994 ), and have returned custody of children to abusive fathers, clearly 
divorcing his abusive behaviour towards his partner from his abilities to parent (Freeman 
1995). These decisions privilege the status of the father within the family and further 
blame the victim for the abusive situation she seeks to be free of. Far from freeing women 
from abusive situations, institutions are a part of the conceptual process of enforcing male 
privilege and power over women. 
Treatment programs, legal practices, funding cuts, and social service networks are 
part of the institutionalization of patriarchy. Institutions are muting, and attempting to 
silence altogether the voices of feminists, advocates and battered women who fight for the 
basic recognition of the culpability and complicity of the state and its institutions in 
maintaining the abuse of women. 
As wife assault goes mainstream, I see it being redefined in individualistic 
terms only. We're losing the politics of it all -- any sense that when we 
talk about wife assault, we're talking about a form of personal and social 
control of women in the family that is supported by society's institutions. 
We're seeing a corresponding increase in programs and funding for 
individual solutions, such as counselling and treatment, at the expense of 
education and advocacy. (Prieur 1995: 257) 
So what are the interests of the state? Through an analysis of Gusfield's processes of 
the construction of social problems to an analysis of the shelter movement, the answer 
seems clear -- to maintain the status quo. This means maintaining the oppression of 
women through the repression and dismissal of their individual experiences that run 
contrary to created institutional knowledge, undermining action against patriarchal beliefs 
and values, and controlling the framework through which the problem of wife abuse is 
analyzed. Institutions also dominate the discursive arena in which these discussions take 
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place. This last criterion brings us to the subject of the next section: How institutions 
control and maintain power and dominant ideology is a critical mechanism by which 
power relations shift or are maintained. The preceding sections provided a locus from 
which larger social relations can be organized, framing them within the standpoint of 
Melanie. The next section steps back from her direct account, and discusses the discursive 
climate which informs and organizes her local context. 
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Chapter 5 
Law and the Helping Professions: An Analysis of the Discursive Regime of 
Institutions 
The emergence of dominant constructions of identity within specific 
locations in time and space suggests a point of intersection between 
structures of domination, symbolic orders, and legitimation. This point of 
intersection defines a relation of asymmetry in the production of dominant 
discourses on social identity formations. The notion of "discursive 
hegemony" points to the privileged position held by dominant social groups 
with respect to discourse. It also presupposes that societies are containers 
of a "plurality of discourses and discursive sites." Discursive hegemony 
does not, therefore, produce automata, willing citizenry absorbing 
pronouncements of identity as these are excluded from a discursively 
privileged leadership. Identity is always a point of both selection and 
contestation and it is through structures of domination and control that 
dominant discourses on identity emerge. (Jabri 1996: 133) 
The partial fusion of the discourses of legal systems and the helping professions results 
in a discursive hegemony. This can be understood best by examining the process of the 
intermingling of legal with other social discourses to determine how discourses 
conceptualized outside traditional legal boundaries affect the conventional legal discourse 
based on concepts of reason, truth and justice. The arena of law is a terrain of ever-
shifting, and often conflicting discourses, influenced by a number of factors that may be 
perceived as lying outside its traditional boundaries. These boundaries are located in the 
basic philosophy of law, a philosophy centred around the concepts of justice, reason, and 
punitive logic. This philosophy is demonstrated by Samuel Pilsbury in his article 
"Emotional Justice: Moralizing the Passions of Criminal Punishment," 
Like most fields of thought, the law has developed its own vocabulary for 
expressing concepts and promoting values. The language of law is the 
language of rationality, of the cool and the deliberative. While this 
insistence upon rationalistic expression has general merit in the elucidation 
of general issues, in some cases it obscures more than it reveals ... where, 
as in criminal punishment the influence of emotions is too fundamental to 
ignore or entirely condemn, the law' s vocabulary requires expansion to 
permit emotive discourse. (1989: 710) 
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This statement is an example of current liberal legal philosophy. Although Pilsbury admits 
that emotive discourse can be constructively employed in the legal arena in certain 
instances20 and with great caution, he defines law as reflecting an Aristotelian emphasis 
on reason and logic, and a Kantian emphasis on the moral being. This world is one in 
which "punishment signifies our condemnation over that freely made, but morally wrong 
choice" (1989: 661). Phrases such as "language of law" and "law has developed 
its own vocabulary" bestow upon law "its" own particular identity as an autonomous 
being, as an individual with agency and as an institution which stands outside of, or in 
an authoritative relationship to, the rest of society. It also obscures the various agents of 
the legal system. This is a persuasive picture, and while "law" does seem to possess some 
of these characteristics, it is important to remember that as an institution, the legal system 
is intrinsically linked to the social strata, that it cannot operate in a vacuum, and that it 
is not monolithic although it sometimes appears to be. With this in mind, John Brigham's 
admonishment that " .. . we must move from law and society to the perspective of law in 
society" (1987:304) is particularly insightful. Society (all members) does in fact, create 
and maintain law. Jerome Bruner, in "Psychology, Morality, and the Law," draws on 
Robert Cover' s work to situate legal mechanisms within culture. 
20 Pilsbury discusses the issue of capital punishment as evoking a strong emotional 
response from society. 
We inhabit a nomos- a normative universe. We constantly create and 
maintain a world of right and wrong, of lawful and unlawful, of valid and 
void. The student of law may come to identify the normative world with 
the professional paraphernalia of social control...No set of legal institutions 
exists apart from the narratives that locate it and give it meaning .. .law 
becomes not only a system of rules to be observed, but a world in which 
we live. (1992: 109) 
Bruner argues that: 
... the formal conduct of law is judged against the background of narrative 
possibility ... how it is seen determines the form of interpretive commitment 
we adopt toward it. In this respect, law can never be regarded as a fixed 
set of rules (as legal positivists had urged) but as a way of acting within 
the nomos (1992: 110). 
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In the same way as society creates and maintains law, individuals interpret and react to 
it in different ways, whether they be plaintiffs or lawyers, judges or jurors. Following 
Bruner and Cover, if law is created and maintained by society and is therefore not fixed 
but fluid and subject to change and interpretation, then as societal norms change, so must 
law. 
As an institution law is an inevitable part of the ruling relations posited by 
Dorothy Smith -- in that they are a party to the creation of objectification of knowledge -
- which as its end result may bear little resemblance to individual conceptions of justice 
or law. This objectification parallels Cover's assertion that "norms are universal and 
enforced by institutions" that in Bruner' s terms "discourse becomes objective" (cited by 
Bruner 1992: 111). This "objective discourse" of law is presented in part as a universal 
and obscuring construction within a society that contributes to its construction; but is not 
wholly owned or operated by it. Much like the anecdotal runaway train, or the monster 
built by Frankenstein, law is the force created but not entirely controlled. Smith (1990) 
argues that 
Objectified forms of knowledge, integral to the organization of ruling, 
claim authority as socially accomplished effects or products, independent 
of their making. Because they are in fact forms of social organization, 
though we can explore them as matters within our reach, as aspects of our 
ordinary competence, as social relations in which we participate, though 
they do not begin and end with our participation.(61) 
81 
This suggests that there is an aspect of law beyond that in which we participate; this 
clearly denotes that law is not only seen as something we do, something that we take part 
in, but as an entity that has some form of shadowy existence that is perceived to be 
outside individual boundaries. However, law as objectified knowledge is no less subject 
to change with a shift in social discourse. 
Discourse 
Discourse itself is a difficult concept to grasp, partly because of its slippery usage 
and multiplicity of meanings. Peter Goodrich explains that the term has some "fashionable 
if diffuse currency," and further states that discourse 
... can be applied to any sequence of utterances at the level of the sentence 
or above .. .In potential it thus ranges in scope from the seemingly universal 
problems of the structural features of culture, communication and ideology 
as the intrinsic problems of the theory of discourse, right the way down to 
the minute questions of the syntactic and semantic analysis of the specific, 
historical singular, text or utterance, studied in discourse analysis. (1987: 
125) 
His first definition is relevant to this project insofar as discourse is defined in 
conversational terms, as speech that may influence or inform a subject matter, however, 
studying discourse at the level of syntactic utterance is not within the scope of this 
discussion. Goodrich's second definition, concerning the structural features of culture is 
much closer to the meaning of discourse discussed here. 
The most immediate and obvious difficulties to be raised by the term 
discourse itself are not only those of the multiplicity of differing levels of 
usage, but more ambitiously, are those of attempting to formulate and 
substantiate the complex relationship of structural features, or regularities, 
of systems of communication as discursive formations, to their agency or 
manifestation in empirical practice. (1987: 125) 
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Theoretical attempts to study discursive formations link actual utterances with the creation 
of bodies of knowledge which inform and influence the epistemology of cultural 
structures. For example, political lobbying and adoption of certain forms of rhetoric, such 
as rights rhetoric used by gay rights movements (Brigham 1987), have been influenced 
by and do influence law to varying degrees, causing an epistemological or ideological 
shift in legal vantage. Goodrich further asserts that although law cannot solely be analyzed 
in terms of discourse, it can neither be left to the auspices of the "formalistic, and indeed 
naturalistic, legal philosophies," which have "consistently endeavoured to define law in 
terms of a common or single essence, or content of the legal sphere" (1987: 158). This 
latter view in Goodrich's estimation is particularly dangerous as it denies that " .. .law is 
a social practice formally tied to particular institutions, or apparatuses and primarily, 
though by no means exclusively, defined by its use of particular types of discourse"(1987: 
159). Law as social practice is closer to the types of inconsistency which Melanie 
experienced when dealing with individual agents. 
Carol Smart, in Law, Crime and Sexuality, speaks of discourse in a similar 
fashion, drawing on the connection of discourse to the formation of the subject and to the 
narratives which contribute to the discursive formation of the subject. By discursive 
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formation, Smart means that levels of ideology or rhetoric, which influence an individual 
are also employed by and individual to place her/him within the contexts of culture and 
society. This theory of discourse, like those of Bruner, Cover and Smith, places the 
subject in society, at the centre of discursive analysis. 
This emphasis shifts attention away from the idea of pre-given entities (for 
example, the criminal, the prostitute, the homosexual) towards an 
understanding of how such subjects come into being at certain moments. 
This entails a significant shift in perception away from the idea that people 
exist in an a priori state, waiting for institutions to act on them, towards 
thinking about subjects who are continually being constituted and who 
constitute themselves through language/discourse.(1995: 8) 
However, Smart's view of law as discourse differs from Goodrich's in one essential way. 
She encourages us to view law almost solely as discourse, as an extremely powerful 
discourse, instead of an institution. 
Thus we can shift our understanding of law(s) away from the concept of 
it being an institution, towards the idea of law as a discourse which is, in 
turn, a significantly powerful discourse because of its situation in the 
hierarchy of knowledges and its power to subjugate other discourses 
(namely, law' s version of rape versus women' s versions of rape). (1995: 
8) 
Her notion of what constitutes an institution is slightly problematic, since one can pose 
the question: What is an institution if not an extremely powerful body of objectified 
knowledge that holds authority over others? Smart also tends to underestimate the power 
of contradictory discourses to influence law. 
The interaction between power and discourse is taken up by Sally Engle Merry, 
in Getting Justice, Getting Even: Legal Consciousness in Working-Class America. Merry 
offers extensive insights into the mechanisms of discourse. In her discussion of the New 
England lower court system, she draws from Foucault to state: 
Distinct ways of talking and of interpreting events constitute discourses. I 
am using discourse in the sense which Foucault uses the term, rather than 
the quite different usage of sociolinguists .. .In his view, discourses are 
means of exercising power in subtle, disguised ways ... Modem discourses 
or languages such as psychiatry, penology, criticism, and history, are 
invisible but are also a language of control. (1990: 110) 
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She further describes the foundations of discourse as having "a more or less coherent set 
of categories and theories of action: a vocabulary for naming events and persons and a 
theory for explaining actions and relationships (1990: 110). Merry' s concept of discourse 
parallels Smith's notion of objectified knowledge as a part of the production of culture, 
as something underlying, but rarely questioned in society. "Each discourse consists of an 
explicit repertoire of justifications and explanations and an implicit, embedded theory 
about why people act the way they do" (1990: 110). Merry' s definition frames legal 
discourse in the context of culture and dislodges it from the somewhat lofty heights in 
which some legal theorists would have us believe it exists. Law then, is considered by 
some to be a domain that carries at its center a philosophical discourse of reason and 
justice. This discourse has been shaped and is continually being reshaped by society as 
it constantly redefines the nomos, or normative universe, in which we live. In the 
following sections, various factors will be described which have informed shifts in legal 
discourse to some extent. 
John Brigham' s "Right, Rage and Remedy: Forms of Law in Political Discourse" 
discusses how law informs political action, and in turn, how political action influences 
law. Brigham examines the movements of alternative dispute resolution, gay rights, and 
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feminist anti-pornography in order to determine how ideas about law influence social 
relations. 
These three categories are not exhaustive, but they capture a broad range 
of significant political action and legal signification. Movement 
discourse ... may draw on ideas about law so settled and so distinctive that 
in themselves they define a given movement's "practices." These practices 
are constituted by and in turn constitute, different and identifiable 
interpretive communities. (1987:307) 
Brigham proceeds to describe how political movements organize themselves around law 
and may employ legal terms, as the gay rights movement did when adopting "rights" 
rhetoric. Groups may adopt a pseudo-legal platform in order to politicize them. Brigham 
describes this as "acting politically in a legal order"(1987: 316). We can chart for 
ourselves the political discourses raging across the field of law; whether they be centered 
around the abortion issue, human rights law, or alternative sentencing they all employ 
their own languages and constructions of reality, and their own view of what law should 
be and is, and what law can do. 
Brigham's political discourses of "rights," "rage" and "remedy" figure prominently 
as he describes how " .. . the material consequences of law's authority ... calls people together 
in time and place ... provides the focus for their political activity" (1992: 315). It also 
determines, in most cases the discourses which are adopted to combat the legal system, 
in order to achieve a strategic political goal. It would be sheer folly to assume that these 
discourses do not affect the legal system and that individuals are not affected by socio-
legal change. This adoption of established discourse is disputed as characterizing a 
reformist rather than transformative agenda, however, the fact remains that it does 
influence legal discourse. 
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In continuing the discussion of how other discourses shift those of law, N. Zoe 
Hilton, warns of the dangers of adoption of discourses, even if the discourses seem to be 
about empowerment and egalitarian relations. She uses the example of mediation as an 
alternative to traditional legal process. 
The mediation movement has reached a peak in popularity, and a trend 
towards diverting family law cases into informal dispute resolution is more 
apparent. In this way, battered women may now find themselves 
negotiating with their abuser behind the closed doors of the mediation 
room ... Mediation promotes assumptions of equality and gender neutrality 
with obvious appeal to a broadly feminist perspective. (1991: 30) 
Hilton examines the concept of the "new egalitarian family" that has grown out of a 
feminist-friendly discourse that promotes egalitarian power relationships within marriages. 
This discourse has been adopted by mediation, regardless of the reality of inequality 
between abusers and their spouses. She draws from M. Shaffer to state: 
The discourse of neutrality and mutual agreement, therefore, is a "suspect 
concept...masking societal norms and values" and making the institution of 
mediation sound benevolent, when in fact it is of dubious value for women 
and especially dangerous for battered women. (1992: 36) 
Feminist discourse then can be co-opted to promote a process that is not necessarily 
beneficial to women. Other discourses come into play when considering the issue of 
mediation. Mediation is rendered far more acceptable through the intertwined factors of 
cost and 1990s humanitarian discourse. 
Mediators, feminists and politicians all anticipate the expansion of 
mediation because of the calls for a reorganization of the whole court 
structure in Ontario and the present overcrowding and underfunding of the 
court system. (1992: 32) 
Thus the cost initiatives and shift in discourse from punitive controls, which would cause 
further strain on the judiciary system, intertwine with a feminist discourse to produce an 
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alternative mechanism, which may be detrimental to the interests of the women involved 
in family law cases. In part, Hilton traces this crisis back to an attempt on the behalf of 
the battered women' s movement to secure recognition of the problem of spousal abuse. 
"As compliments to the courts, administrative legal procedures such as mediation can 
serve to relieve the formal justice system of the very strain which has been imposed by 
the battered women's movement" (1992: 32). This is no criticism of the attempts to 
validate women' s experience or to empower individuals, but it serves as a warning that 
any discourse, even a feminist one, can be appropriated and used in a way that may not 
be originally intended. It can be and is used in a way that produces contradictory, if not 
negative results. Once unleashed, discourse cannot be controlled, nor can its outcome be 
predicted.21 For example, the adoption of an egalitarian discourse in mediation, as Hilton 
describes, can ignore the power imbalance between battered women and their abusers. 
This can have a devastating impact on women in custody settlements and property 
disputes. 
The discourses of what Martha Fineman calls the "helping professions" have been 
key influences in changing legal discourse. By "helping professions" Fineman refers " 
principally to social workers, others trained in mental health and/or the behavioral 
sciences, and mediators" ( 1988: 728) Fineman contends that the discourses of the helping 
professions have been absorbed law to the extent that they have now an almost exclusive 
21 It is interesting to note that this argument parallels that of Carol Smart with 
respect to legal reforms, which employ discourses in order to produce change. See Law, 
Crime and Sexuality. The appropriation of discourse is also discussed in Jo-Anne Fiske's 
"The Womb is to the Nation as the Heart is to the Body: Ethnopolitical discourses of the 
Canadian Indigenous Women' s Movement." 
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position of determining child custody placements. She terms this to be a result of a 
"competition between the legal and helping professions over the custody decision-making 
process" (1988: 731). She also contends that 
The professional language of the social workers and mediators has 
progressed to become the public, then the political, then the dominant 
rhetoric. It now defines the terms of contemporary discussions about 
custody and effectively excludes or minimizes contrary ideologies and 
concepts. (1988: 730) 
This progression of discourse into the everyday language of society is an extension of the 
process that Merry calls "naming." Naming is the process by which ruling institutions gain 
power and authority. As earlier noted, one process of discourse is having a vocabulary for 
naming or providing the framework for, persons and events and a way in which to explain 
the world. Merry expands this concept: 
The naming of an action or event within a particular discourse, thus 
interpreting the event's meaning and assessing the motives behind it, is 
therefore an act of power. Each naming points to a solution. If the family 
problem is interpreted as caused by a mean and vengeful father, the 
solution is different than if it is caused by a father afflicted with the 
disease of alcoholism. (1990: 111) 
In Fineman's case the language of the profession of social work has permeated the socio-
legal realm (and vice versa) and therefore determines the framework for the discussion 
of child custody. Therefore, the dominant language of child custody will be in the social 
rather than purely legal realm. A certain authority comes with the acceptance of language, 
authority that is valued as power within society, and is validated as such. Dorothy Smith 
says of authority in public discourse: 
Authority in the public discourse is not defined by pos1t10n in a 
determinant system of positions, as it is in organizational hierarchies. It 
appears instead as the difference between the credibility granted to some 
sources and the treatment of others as mere opm10n or as lacking 
credibility in some way. Authority bleeds from the institutional relations 
of ruling to the relations of authority at the surface of media.(1990: 101) 
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Fineman states that the transformation of child custody discourse has been demonstrated 
by contrasting, "the competing discourses of the adversarial model, populated by judges 
and attorneys, and the therapeutic model, populated by social workers and mediators" 
(1988: 731). Fineman asseverates that the discourse of social work, which redefines the 
spousal relationship instead of terminating it as legal discourse did, has the primary result 
of awarding joint custody, which ultimately disadvantages custodial mothers (who assume 
primary child care responsibilities without full custody). Fineman also contends that the 
voices of these custodial mothers are not heard because they lack a recognized discourse 
and also because their concerns cannot be expressed through any validated discourse. 
The helping professions' ability to suggest and obtain such a radical 
change in substantive policy derives in part from their ability to present the 
debate over divorce and custody as one involving the treatment of an 
emotional crisis rather than the solution to a legal problem .. .In this sense, 
the helping professions ignored the fact of, and the justifications for, the 
differing legal consequences that flowed from the labels of "custodial 
parent" and "noncustodial parent." (1988: 733) 
Because of this shift, the discourse of social work is considered credible (it has been 
backed up by institutional authority) in Smith's terms, and any discourse put forward by 
custodial mothers is considered lacking in credibility (it has no institutional authority to 
back it). When the legal system validates the discourse of social work and delegates this 
kind of authority, its discourse is modified. Here, the helping professions have gained 
greater control over the shaping of the normative universe, which is entrenched by the 
infusion of "therapeutic" discourse into culture and society. 
90 
This shift in legal discourse towards "treatment" or "remedy," as Bruner puts it, 
is traced by Merry in her examination of the New England Lower court system. She 
identifies three discourses present in her analysis: legal discourse, moral discourse, and 
a therapeutic or treatment discourse. The treatment discourse is of particular interest, since 
it reflects the current trend in law to frame issues in such a way as to delegate them to 
the helping professions and alternative sentencing mechanisms. 
This is a discourse drawn from the helping professions, one which talks of 
behaviour as environmentally caused, rather than based on individual fault. 
Crowding, stress, or low levels of tolerance for frustration- rather than 
inborn evil, lack of consideration, or lack of respect- are blamed for 
offensive behaviour. Offensive behaviour is socially caused, not the result 
of individual will... (Merry 1990: 114) 
A language of disfunction dominates this discourse. Merry also considers alcoholism, 
mental illness, and emotional immaturity signifiers of this discourse. She notes that this 
discourse withholds justice and in the Foucaultian tradition denies "the person described 
full personhood and full responsibility" (1990: 114). Thus we have the discursive 
formation of a subject -- characterized by the "sickness" of an individual -- which suggests 
that the method of social control be shifted from punishment to treatment. Merry notes 
that this discourse is widely used by, and known to, the general public and that it is often 
employed in cases of a domestic nature. 
Blame is mitigated. Of her husband's violence, a woman may say: "But he 
works hard and gets tense and frustrated." Or, when her husband drinks too 
much, a woman may say: "He had a hard childhood and had to move 
around a lot." (Merry 1990: 115) 
Martin appeals to this discourse when he mitigates blame for his violence by referencing 
early childhood problems, and inability to control his anger, and Melanie, through her 
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initial acceptance of a treatment program as a remedy, references it as well. 
One of the primary questions pertaining to the absorption of treatment discourse 
into legal theory is whether the helping professions can accomplish their goals of 
"healing" and "treatment." We might take some caution from the example of mediation. 
The authority delegated by the court to the helping professions has resulted in alternative 
sentencing measures such as mediation is reflected in court-directed treatment programs 
(CDTPs). Hilton, Fineman, and Merry all have reservations with respect to mediation for 
various reasons. Hilton notes that the assumption of the "new egalitarian family" will 
ultimately undermine the intent of mediation; Fineman considers the shift of child custody 
discourse away from the legal to ultimately disadvantage custodial mothers; and Merry 
notes that mediation may not be taken seriously by all parties involved because of its 
nonpunitive nature. 
Violent men may be directed to treatment programs by the court instead of serving 
time in jail. Women have been noted as saying: "I don't want him to go to jail, I just 
want him to get help," or "I love him, I just want him to stop abusing me." These appeals 
to the court, based on the discourse of treatment, are linked to other discourses and 
considerations, such as: 
cost, in terms of the overcrowding of jails and the expense of keeping 
prisoners; 
the discourse of feminism, an appeal to stop the abuse of women and 
curtail repeat offenses;22 
22 Caesar and Hamberger (1989) discuss the development of treatment programs as 
evolving around feminist demands that women's safety be a primary concern. Feminists 
recognized that shelters were only part of the solution and that simply removing the 
the discourse of the helping professions, a therapeutic discourse that labels 
the problem one of relationships, anger management and societal stress 
which can be "cured"; and 
the derivative discourse of 90s liberal humanism, a mix of various 
discourses, which stresses that no one "learns" anything in jail, and that 
rehabilitation is a key factor in improving society as a whole.23 
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Liberal legalism (MacKinnon 1983) and therapeutic discourse combine with concepts of 
a "benevolent" state bent on diverting the costs of the increasing caseload of domestic 
violence and the already overburdened justice system. Gusfield (1989) addresses this 
briefly in a discussion of the decriminalization of public drunkenness. The pressure of 
these discourses combine to create a climate where domestic violence is situated in the 
more "appropriate"24 domain of the helping professions, who are concerned with feelings, 
emotions, and interpersonal dynamics (Merry, 1990). To this we can also add individual 
pathologies, skill deficits, and trauma. Institutionally, this creates and reinforces the 
validity of the helping professions, entrenches their control as ruling institutions, and 
partly removes the onus from the legal institution to solve these social problems. Tamar 
woman from a violent situation would not alleviate the broader problem. 
23 See Chatterjee (1993) who describes nationalist discourse as a derivative 
discourse. When constructing a counter discourse, aspects of the original discourse play 
out within it. Brigham demonstrates this with the "rights" discourse, which is derived from 
traditional liberal legal notions of human rights. Fiske (1996) builds on Chatterjee' s 
nationalist derivative discourse to demonstrate how the nationalist discourses of First 
Nations organizations are derived from traditional, and gendered, Colonial discourses of 
national collectivity. 
24 Note here that Merry considers the language of "appropriate" and "inappropriate" 
to indicate a discursive shift from the legal to non legal. 
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Pitch describes the administration of an "institutional residue, "25 to describe psychiatric 
custodial institution's control of a "heterogeneous population whose problems overflowed 
the scientific and professional boundaries of other institutions (like medicine and criminal 
justice) ... " (1995: 114). This, in part, helps us to understand the delegation of battering 
to the control of the helping professions which are viewed, because of the popular 
acceptance of treatment and neo-liberal discourse, as more adequately equipped to deal 
with barterers. I coin the use of a parallel term "discursive residue" to describe a discourse 
which appears to span several institutions, but has no definitive seat in any one institution 
such as the aforementioned liberal humanist discourse. This massive discursive "grey area" 
is composed of, and exists in itself as, a complex derivative discourse where subtle and 
often contradictory discourses play with and against each other within a societal 
consciousness. 
This partial delegation of authority poses many problems in cases of male violence 
against their partners. The "treatment" or "healing" discourse is only partly adopted by 
the court, creating paradoxical situations and clashes in philosophy, whilst signalling to 
society that treatment programs are effective and have been validated by the state as an 
means of eradicating violence. Farida Shaheed, in her discussion of women living under 
Muslim laws indicates that the entire structure of social relations does not, and most likely 
will not, change just because one facet of social relations does. Contrary social relations, 
like discourses can exist in the same systems . 
... Changes in social relations do not displace all existing structures. Only 
25 Pitch takes this term from De Leonardis . 
those in direct contradiction with changed material conditions will be 
dismantled or modified. The introduction of a capitalist system of 
production ... did not eradicate the existing structures of patriarchy in these 
societies. (1994: 999) 
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So too with discourse, if legal discourse accepts that of the helping professions, it does 
not necessarily mean that the so-called reason-centered core of legal philosophy will 
change. This allows two discourses to exist in contention with another. The validation of 
treatment discourse and the attendant dejudicialization (Dufresne 1995) of battering stands 
at odds with the "get tough on domestic violence" stance taken by legal policy. If, under 
legal process, the barterer acknowledges that he has made a freely chosen, but morally 
wrong choice (Pilsbury: 1989), the discourse of the healing professions contradicts this 
through the acceptance of diversion of blame to social stress and other factors. At the 
same time that the offender is accepting responsibility, he is allowed to sidestep 
accountability in the admission of his "sickness." In accepting that the offender is a victim 
of social stresses, coping deficits and societal defects and that the abused is a victim of 
this victim, issues of accountability and responsibility on the barterer' s part are glossed 
over or completely sidestepped. This discourse is absorbed into society even when cases 
are not brought to court. Who then is responsible? This accountability paradox leaves 
room for the shifting of blame onto the unapprehendable shoulders of society (or onto the 
shoulders of women). In demanding an accountability on the part of the offender, the 
criterion of the legal institution is met, yet the "sick" we are told, are not accountable. 
We are then left with the question as to whether the therapeutic discourse serves 
to empower and protect women. The supposed focus of treatment programs for men who 
batter is on the protection and further prevention of violence against women. With the 
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strength of treatment discourse so entrenched in society that acts of violence against 
women are viewed as springing from a sickness, how can a woman argue that a violent 
man be put in jail for his "crimes?" Would she dare contest his placement in a program, 
especially when his "wellness" is at stake? Can either incarceration or treatment, as they 
exist currently, really help to end wife battering? 
As has been demonstrated, the power dynamics between men who batter and their 
partners are radically skewed in favour of the barterer and can influence decisions and 
behaviour in myriad ways. Melanie, and other women like her, have argued that the 
reality of abuse is that men who batter are always sorry for their violence after the fact, 
and that many would enter treatment programs as a way of evading jail or other punitive 
measures. Can the coercive power of the court "force" men to rehabilitate? Can men 
rehabilitate when larger institutional ideologies (actual practices) cannot hold them 
responsible for their choices to batter? Women know that the institutions have not 
transformed their victim-blaming ideologies. 
The danger lies in accepting dominant discourse at face value, as both Hilton and 
Fineman warn, and accepting institutions which use this dominant discourse to maintain 
a patriarchal ideology. The mechanisms of ruling institutions and objectified knowledges 
are inherent in discourses which attempt to "serve society," Smith asserts, and may not 
in actuality serve individual women. As Sabini and Silver say of social psychology: 
We had the view that the moral dimension in social psychology was 
submerged: not in the way that a sunken treasure chest is submerged- for 
all intents and purposes nonexistent- but the way that the supports of the 
Golden Gate Bridge are submerged- out of sight, but supporting the 
structure that everyone admires. (1992: 80) 
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We must critically examme the intentions and underlying assumptions made in the 
acceptance of treatment programs and the legal system's adoption of "healing" discourse 
as well as make room for the individual voices of women, who are ending up revictimized 
by the very institutions that purport to help them. 
The Battle Over Discourse: The Feminist Challenge 
As Jabri points out in the opening quotation, individual identities are not made up 
of persons "brainwashed" by dominant discourse, but are formed out of complex 
interactions with discourses, ideologies, institutions and experience. It is also important 
to note here that institutional relations have the greatest control over the dissemination of 
information and maintenance of ideology in the discursive arena. Individual discourses are 
difficult to locate within this monopoly. Hirsch gives an example of feminist loss on the 
discursive battleground 
... as the movement itself gained political legitimacy and adopted 
bureaucratic organization, activists' early hard-edged discourse linking 
domestic violence to systemic gender inequality became muffled by talk 
of serving individual clients and seeking mediated or therapeutic help. 
(1994: 7) 
That social movements maintain any discourse against a dominant ideology of treatment 
is admirable, that an individual alone can hope to do such, seems impossible. It becomes 
crucial then, for the consciousness raising and activism of battered women and advocates 
to continue despite threatened institutional appropriation. 
The achievements of women' s movements, while significant, are 
increasingly threatened by the discourses of the helping professions, despite 
the growing numbers of feminist professionals. The patriarchal constraints 
of the disciplines within which they operate have proven difficult to shed. 
Professional intervention is threatening to undermine the significant 
revelations brought about by that unique feminist methodology called 
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consciousness-raising. (Romany 1994: 286) 
What ensues is a struggle to control ideology through discursive practice; a struggle that 
pits the "liberal state" entrenched in patriarchal relations, with the authority and power to 
validate the discourses of both liberal legalism and psychological discourses, against a 
feminist movement whose discourses must necessarily rest in a resistance of dominant 
ideology that stresses the male dominated relations of ruling. Feminist discourse must be 
made up of the experiences of battered women and advocates. The prize of this battle is 
the right to define women' s lives and experiences. Efforts by feminists within institutions 
are curtailed by larger institutional structures which sabotage transformative agendas. As 
individuals, we are all "born to discursive and institutional continuities which define and 
bind particular societies .... " but we also have a responsibility to transform the "social 
systems which are in existence through a community of practice" (Jabri 1996: 134); not 
only a community of practice, but a community of complicity. 
Chapter 6 
Feminism and Discursive Power 
Criminalization is a significant step in the politicization of violence against 
women, yet it must be exorcized of the imperial intervention of the helping 
professions. First, the criminal justice system, by relying on the alleged 
ungendered discourse of the helping professions, undercuts the 
criminalization agenda and obscures its social control functions. Second, 
the helping profession's discourse impacts on the legal system to privilege 
the dysfunctional over the gender dimensions of violence. This blurs the 
boundaries between the legal, the therapeutic, and the political which must 
be maintained to address the problem of domestic violence. Third, the 
mediation of women's experience through the discourse of the helping 
professions dispossesses women of the definitional control essential to the 
politicization of violence. We increasingly witness the devastating 
consequences of professional discourse's trespasses: the relegation oflegal 
guarantees of women's dignity, bodily integrity, and self-determination to 
the alleys while the rehabilitation of the family unit or the victims of 
"psychological dysfunction" travel the main roads. (Romany 1995: 287). 
The Myth of Mutual Violence and the De-Gendering of Violence 
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Miller (1994) discusses the rejection of feminist ideologies about violence by 
clinicians on the basis of two presumptions. The first is based on the "fact" that women 
are as violent or more violent than their male partners, and that for a patriarchal theory 
to hold all men would be batterers. The second is based on the premise that lesbian 
relationships are violent also, which would exclude any analysis of intimate relationships 
based on gender inequality. Both these theories attack feminist analysis on the basis of 
their "unidimensional representations" of violent behaviour. Miller critiques both of these 
"hasty" assumptions: 
Dutton begins by identifying what he sees as an ideological transgression 
characteristic of feminist analysis because of their devotion to viewing 
patriarchy as the cause of "wife assault." Dutton identifies this (misguided) 
focus as the problem of "ecological fallacy" ... In fact, much of the recent 
compelling scholarship on domestic violence steers clear of blaming 
patriarchy as the sole or direct causal factor while maintaining that gender 
remains a crucial key explanatory variable. Rather, patriarchy provides a 
historical and contemporary foundation to assist in explaining the pervasive 
and enduring quality of (white, middle and upper class, heterosexual) male 
privilege and power that has created and defined our systems .. . (1994: 184) 
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Miller's attempt to keep gender at the forefront of analysis and her insistence on the 
patriarchal underpinnings of society is both commendable and necessary when faced with 
such clinical and individualistic explanations of wife abuse. She further contends that 
Dutton has conveniently sidestepped the activist movement and insists that he has ignored 
the feminist recognition that battered women are not unidimensional. Battering 
experiences are similar, she contends, but not battered women. This strengthens the 
movement rather than detracts from it. Dutton' s "ahistorical and superficial critique of 
feminist analysis is precisely why feminist analyses are crucial: Human behaviour is 
anchored by sociocultural beliefs shaped by gender politics" (1994: 195). Dutton also 
relies on essentialist ideas about women to form his own basis, which constitutes more 
justification than explanation, of wife abuse. 
Overall, Dutton dismisses "gender politics," finding no relationship to 
intimate violence. He sees the powerlessness of men (e.g., their inability 
to have "power advantage" women have in women' s ability to "introspect, 
analyze, and describe feelings and processes," ... (Miller 1994: 186) 
If these are not notions integral to "gender politics," then what are? 
Clinicians then fall back on data that "prove" that women are more violent than 
men. McNeely, in a commentary about whether or not domestic violence is a human or 
gender issue, states 
Contrary to popular conception, many studies reported during the last 15 
years have trumpeted the pervasiveness of both male and female domestic 
violence .... This fact tends to startle people, since they believe that female 
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assaultive behaviour is only in response to male behaviour .... 
He affirms Straus's view that "[t]he old cartoons of the wife chasing the husband with a 
rolling pin or throwing pots and pans are closer to reality than most -- and especially 
those with feminist sympathies-- realize" (1990: 129-130). As Dobash and Dobash (1988; 
1992), Bograd (1990) and Renzetti (1994) point out, statistics that target women as 
equally or more violent than men are the result of a "neutral" Conflict and Tactics Scales 
(CTS) which treat acts of violence as equal; a tendency to ignore retaliatory or self-
defending violent acts; and a denial of the fact that women are more likely to be killed 
or injured by men than the other way around. Studies that show that lesbians "do it too," 
are as guilty of not considering other mitigating factors, such as learned inequitable sex 
role stereotyping as the marginalization of lesbians within a patriarchal system (Miller 
1994). 
At the same time that some fields are opening up to analyses of gender and wife 
abuse and are seriously attempting to pay it more than lipservice, feminist discourses on 
equality are being used against them. Stell, who discusses the societal legitimation of 
women who use terminal force against their abusers, places the blame for their abuse on 
sexist women who accept the male role of protector. The following quote indicates that 
in Stell's estimation, it is women who, more or less, deserve what they get. 
But sexist stereotypes about women and violence will survive such 
palliatives [referring to increased shelters and arrest policies]. Most women 
(and feminists, ironically) continue to believe that their physical safety 
should rest in the hands of men primarily and that it is unfeminine to take 
seriously the practical implications of assuming the responsibility for 
protecting themselves ... there can be no equality in a relationship in which 
one party depends for her physical safety on the other. (1991: 257) 
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This misogynist belief that women are in some way responsible for abuse because of their 
sexist attitudes about male protection is infuriating. Most women want protection from 
their abusers, not aftheir abusers. Stell' s and McNeely's condescending attitudes toward 
feminist philosophy are, if not typical, at least frequent markers of mainstream attitudes 
towards feminism. Both Walker (1990) and Barnsley (1985) have noted comments about 
not letting "the feminists" get their own way when working within institutions. Barnsley 
notes 
Feminism is being challenged again. Of course, it has always been a 
challenge to be a feminist. There have always been demands for feminists 
to justify our politics, to re-define what feminism means -- a fact we can 
easily forget in the face of whatever demand that is. Each set of challenges 
and attacks from inside and outside the movement has made us vulnerable 
and defensive as feminists, afraid the movement may break apart all 
together. (Barnsley 1995: 215) 
As well as constant attacks on feminist ideology from outside the movement, 
feminist ideology is questioned from within as well. Until this point, I have discussed 
feminism as a seamless, and unified whole: it is not. Until now, I have been primarily 
speaking of a general feminist belief which stems from a fundamental analysis of gender 
inequality and analysis of women's oppression. 
Smith says that general feminist politics "spanning the left-to-right spectrum ... boil down 
to an attempt to understand the system of inequality in a society whereby males dominate 
females" (1990: 257). What is not constant are the approaches or priorities of specific 
feminist agendas. It would be misguiding to fail to problematize a unified feminist stance, 
especially when considering the formulation of feminist discourses to combat mainstream 
attitudes about violence. It is absolutely necessary to discuss trends in feminist thought, 
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and how the contested nature of feminist politics can have both positive and disastrous 
effects for this formulation. 
Feminist Practice and Theory: Critiques From Within "The" Movement 
Miller criticizes Dutton's perception of feminist theory as "lumping together and 
castigating all feminist research as if there is only one kind of feminism (ignoring the 
different philosophies and goals of liberal, socialist, Marxist, radical, and postmodem 
feminisms)" (1994: 184). While this is a correct statement to one extent, it also serves to 
distance "good" feminist research from "bad" feminist research, and de-emphasizes the 
common concern of sexual inequality that is shared by feminisms. This project has largely 
concentrated on feminist activists and researchers who have worked around or in the 
feminist consciousness-raising and shelter movements, and would find a common theme 
in a definition articulated by Barnsley. 
We suggest that feminism (that of being a feminist) means starting with 
women's experience, putting women first, making connections between our 
experiences as women, and analysing how women live in society. It means 
that women are oppressed socially and economically and that all of us as 
women are affected by women's oppression. (Of course it also means a 
commitment to working in whatever ways we can to end women's 
oppression). (1985: 8) 
The articulation of these ideals has been criticized in two distinct ways. The first critique 
is levelled at the transition house movement itself, and deals with the exclusion of 
marginalized women by the predominantly white-and-middle-class initiated political 
movement. The second criticism is that feminism itself has been absorbed into institutional 
settings, and that certain types of feminist research no longer seek social change or unity 
of any sort, subverting the ultimate goal of transformative politics. 
The first criticism is characterized by Lawrence as suffering from 
the tension between claiming an authoritative voice based on the notion of 
indisputable experience, and in recognizing the manner in which discourse 
shapes experience into a number of interpretations. The authoritative voice 
must inevitably claim a "universal" experience for abused women, with all 
the risks inherent in essentializing a narrow range of experiences as "the 
battered woman's experience" .... (1996: 37) 
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Lawrence cites the domination of the white, middle-class woman as the predominant 
experience posited by "experts" on battered women; excluding the experiences of poor and 
working-class women, aboriginal women and women of color. These experiences, she 
notes, are sometimes absent from representations of battered women as are women' s 
difficulties with drug and alcohol abuse, low self-esteem and women's difficulties with 
often illegal trades. She also states that, often, the dissident voices of women whose 
experiences do not lead them to the same conclusions of the movement are "lost" in the 
face of feminist discourses on violence. The inaccessibility and biases entrenched in the 
movement prove to exclude them from the ideals stated above. 
One tangible result of feminism's failure to address the issues of more 
marginalized women was that I had not been able, during my time in the 
movement to address any aspect of working-class patriarchal biases -that 
smart women were to be cut down to size, that women who drank were 
worthless, and that angry women deserved whatever they got. In a sense, 
I had been unable to access feminism where I lived; it had remained 
largely unreal to me. (Lawrence 1996: 6) 
Failure to deal with the racism, ethnocentrism and elitism within shelters, and within the 
feminist movement itself, inhibits the growth of feminist theorizing and undercuts the 
ideology of ending women' s oppression. Barnsley identifies this as the most urgent 
challenge facing the movement, she proclaims that "[f]eminism will be meaningless unless 
we practice what it means.... This means confronting the reality of racism and 
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discrimination that women experience in this movement, as well as outside it" (1995: 
217). Lawrence notes that the problem itself does not "originate within feminism; rather, 
it represents a feminism which has not sufficiently divested itself of the colonizing habits 
of the dominant society" (1996: 37). She ultimately concludes that there are advantages 
to presenting a unified experience, but that it must be theorized from a larger breadth of 
experience, even if that means walking the fine line of relativity. 
The second critique of feminism originates within a current trend of theoretical 
analyses that locates women's experience in such a singular context that it renders 
impossible any theorizing of unified experience. Ebert identifies this trend as ludic 
(playful or to play) postmodemism. The core of ludic postmodernism is constructed 
around notions of difference, which disable feminist discourses of unity against oppression 
and instigate a "war on totality." 
In feminism the war on totality, as both these essays demonstrate, has 
meant especially a war on those feminist theorists who have attempted to 
articulate the systematicity of patriarchal oppression and gender 
exploitation... . Such attacks on such committed feminists as MacKinnon, 
who has long been on the frontiers of critique and intervention in the 
systematic exploitation of women' s sexuality and labor, should be a serious 
warning to us to rethink the political consequences of feminist involvement 
in ludic (post)modemism .. .it excludes and occludes the critiques of global 
or structural relations of power by calling them "totalizing." (Ebert 1995: 
352) 
Ludic postmodemism does more that remind us of the race, class and other differences 
which divide women, it destroys any critique of a common oppression of women by 
positing that each woman has a different, separate, and distinct multiplicity of oppression 
that act differently on her than any other woman. While this is true to a certain extent, 
the isolation and extremity of "difference" rhetoric invalidates systemic critiques of gender 
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inequality and makes umon on the basis of oppression and transformative politics 
impossible. Ludic postmodemism threatens to divide activist practice from academic 
theory,26 depoliticizing theory and emphasizing the aleatory nature of power. 
Theory as play and theory as explanatory critique are not, as they are 
treated in the contemporary academy, simply two different choices. They 
are contesting modes of understanding social and political arrangements 
and how gender, sexuality, race, and class are situated within such 
arrangements. (Ebert 1996: 14) 
Ludic postmodemism obscures the material practices and relations of power in 
society, to favour of a conceptual blurring of boundaries and transgression of dichotomies. 
For instance, this project is seated in the concept that the traditional public/private 
dichotomy is alive and well maintained in the ruling relations and institutions of society, 
which relegate men to the former and women to the latter. This results in the construction 
of wife abuse as less serious and more in need of the helping professions, and stranger 
abuse as more serious and in need of swift punitive justice. Ludic postmodernists would 
have us disregard these oppositional categories as simplistic and totalizing, and have us 
transgress these boundaries. The difficulty here is that while the ludic postmodernists are 
busy transgressing these in favour of individual analysis of resistance, millions of women 
are suffering from the institutional enforcement of the public/private dichotomy. In short, 
26 This is not to designate all feminists in academia as supportive of postmodem 
politics, but serves to point out that ludic postmodem thought, emerging as it does out of 
a postmodem literary and text based analysis, is common in universities and has "bled" 
into the institutional practice of women' s and gender studies as they are taught. Feminism 
has undoubtably benefited from the development of postmodem thought. It has opened 
up traditional and unquestioned truths and categories to feminist scrutiny, but the 
extremity ofpostmodem analysis would ultimately immobilize any communally instigated 
action. 
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to further Smith's analogy, ludic postmodernists would have us remove the engine from 
the car and then insist that the engine is the car, ignoring the rest of the structural 
relations under which it operates. They would also insist that the car is so different from 
any other car, that it is impossible to compare them. They might in fact, play with the car 
forever, but refuse to understand how it actually works. 
In a ludic postmodern analysis, Melanie' s story would have been taken up as 
interesting text and as an individual site of resistance. The multiplicity of her oppression 
would have been studied, and she would have been heralded as an excellent example of 
a discursive site of singular resistance. Unfortunately, no attempt would have been made 
to link her with the potentially transformative voices of other women, nor would a theory 
have been based on sexual degradation and inequality at a systemic level. Everyone is 
oppressed in a number of different ways, to a number of different levels: differently. The 
goal oftransformative feminist politics is emancipation based on the resistance of material 
oppression. There is no goal of ludic postmodernism: How could there be? Ask Melanie 
whether she would rather be an example of resistance, or an agent of change. You will 
receive an answer which locates her in a struggle against systemic sexual inequality and 
patriarchy. 
Ebert locates the need for continuing transformative practices in what she terms 
resistance (post)modernism. Resistance postmodernism locates gendered oppression, and 
relocates patriarchy as 
fragmented and divided ... able to represent itself as seeming unity that is 
coherent, inviolable and always the same, in other words, continuous; but 
this is an ideological effect--which is not to say that this highly 
differentiated and contradictory structure is not hegemonic .. . (Ebert 1995: 
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354) 
This representation of patriarchy contests the ludic critique of a simple and total 
patriarchy, and displays it as "different reconfigurations of an ongoing structure of 
oppression" (Ebert 1995: 354). Here we are given a picture of patriarchy that can act in 
different ways, oppress in different ways, but that fundamentally disempowers women. 
No matter where women are located, they all are oppressed by this force. This enables 
political resistance by women who do not have to gloss over their differences to unite 
against oppression. Ebert uses the example of the linking of rape to a capitalist patriarchal 
system to elaborate difference between ludic and resistance postmodernism. 
Capitalism has always privileged experience because the logic of 
experience (local and individualistic) distracts critical inquiry and 
transformative action away from the system of capital. Rape is assigned to 
rape crisis centers and individual counselling, on the one hand, and the 
court of law, on the other; rape becomes a matter between two persons and 
not the historically inevitable practices of power in a system that is 
founded upon the exploitation of the many for the benefit of the few. 
(Ebert 1996: 20) 
Like the individualistic and obscuring discourses of psychology in cases of wife abuse, 
individual investigations of oppression without linking them to systemic oppression, can 
lead us away from large-scale understandings of oppression and exploitation of women. 
Ebert locates the politics (or lack thereof) of ludic theory in the entrenchment of the upper 
and middle class individualistic and entrepreneurial interest in the culture of 
commodification in which we live. Ludic politics need not have a point, nor any 
transformative qualities at all, in order to be successful in this culture. Ebert revitalizes 
a postmodern critique grounded in women's relations, built from women' s experiences, 
and equipped to theorize from experience, no matter how different. 
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Conclusions 
The key then, becomes the ability to discursively define the relationships 
surrounding wife abuse, paving the way for a shift in ideological categories that shape 
how we view barterers and battered women. To reiterate Merry, discourse comprises 
justifications and explanations, theories for why people do the things they do. For battered 
women and their advocates, the challenge is to formulate and validate discourses based 
in a gendered analysis of violence that defines barterers as having the choice to batter and 
to control their female partners. How "we" as a society view situations of wife abuse, 
based on shifts in ideology brought about by discursive struggle, will determine how "we" 
as a society solve these situations. This validation of discourse will only be possible if 
women have an avenue through which to share experiences (no matter how diverse) that 
directly combat popular discourses on violence. The historical venues for consciousness-
raising, shelters, transition houses, and women' s centers, must remain in the control of 
women and combat institutional absorption at all costs. If treatment programs are to 
continue, they must closely work with and be accountable to battered women (Hart 1992), 
center around a gendered understanding of violence; and women' s safety must be 
protected at all costs (Hart 1988). Most importantly, discourses preaching mutual 
accountability and mutual violence must be challenged. 
While it is clear that many advances have been made since the women' s movement 
sought to gain public attention for wife abuse, we have still farther to go. Control over 
the prevention and protection of women from abuse is largely held by institutions that 
have, at their centers, a vested interest in maintaining the male-dominated status quo. 
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Feminists continue to challenge these institutions with discourses based on the gender 
inequality between men and women and the patriarchal underpinnings of society. This 
challenge takes place against a continually shifting social consciousness, where the biggest 
piece of the discursive "pie" wins. In order for feminists to compete in the discursive 
arena, we must face the challenges from within, as well as outside the women's 
movement. The discursive arena is a complex mixture of contentious discourses, or a 
discursive residue, which has been heavily influenced by treatment discourses and 
ideologies. The most effective tool we as feminists have are methodologies, theories and 
practices that are based in women's experience. If legal controls are to succeed, there 
must be a significant shift in ideology, based on the societal acceptance that wife abuse 
is as crucial, if not more crucial, than stranger abuse. If treatment models are to be 
effective, the helping or troubled person professions must recognize a feminist discourse 
which starts with women and is accountable to battered women and their advocates. 
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